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The prosecution of combatants who have contravened the law
of war in obedience to a superior order raises perplexing and
profound issues concerning the code of armed conflict. Soldiers are
tutored and trained to comply with commands in order to insure
organizational integrity and efficiency. Their personal safety,
security and self-interest are subordinated to the overarching goal
of safeguarding the sovereign sanctity of the State. On the other
hand, the conduct of armed conflict is constrained by an inter-
nationally mandated code of conflict, which is intended to preserve
humanitarian and humane values. These legal rules reflect the
noble aspirations of chivalry and care and concern for the weak and
* Professor and Head of the Department of Criminal Justice, University of
Illinois at Chicago. Ph.D., Northwestern University; J.D., American University;
LL.M., Harvard University.
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
defenseless, which historically have animated the warrior's ethic.
The law of war also recognizes that while the employment of armed
force is the sovereign prerogative of States, the exercise of this right
may not provide a pretext or occasion to ravage resources,
incinerate the innocent or to eradicate the enemy.'
The effectiveness and enforcement of the law of war, in part,
depends upon soldiers assuming the stance of reasoning and auton-
omous agents rather than reflexive robots. This demands that
subordinates interrogate and resist the demands and directives of
their superiors. In addition, ordinary combatants must be capable
of cataloging and comprehending the encyclopedic rules of the law
of war during the heat of battle, many of which require intricate
and nuanced factual and legal judgments. A measure of courage
also is involved. The requirements of international law may be
counter to the claims of self-preservation which arise during the
course of armed combat. In addition, disobedience to the dictates
of authority may result in discipline, demerit or detention.
The complexity of these conflicting concerns is illustrated by
the conviction and execution of Breaker Morant, a romantic
renegade firmly entrenched in the hagiography of Australia.' By
mid-1900, the British had vanquished their Boer foes and asserted
command and control over South Africa.4 The Boers, however,
resisted formal surrender and dissolved into marauding guerilla
bands
The British military lacked the expertise and experience to
combat the Boers and resorted to scorched earth policies and to the
internment of women and children, tactics which only fanned the
flames of resistance.6 The increasingly desperate British formed a
ferocious fighting force dominated by Australian ranch rovers who
were accustomed to the methods and morality of mobile irregular
1. See generally, GEOFFERY BEST, HUMANITY IN WARFARE (1980); MARK J.
OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE & THE LAW OF WAR
(1999); and MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT
WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 309-16 (1977).
2. See generally id.
3. See generally F.M. CUTLACK, BREAKER MORANT: A HORSEMAN WHO
MADE HISTORY WITH A SELECTION OF HIS BUSH BALLADS (1962); MARGARET
CARNEGIE & FRANK SHIELDS, BREAKER MORANT BALLADIST AND BUSHVELDT
CARBINEER (1979).
4. CUTLACK, supra note 3, at 44.
5. Id. at 46-47. The Boers were a mixture of Dutch and French Huguenots
who are progenitors of the modern Afrikaners. CARNEGIE & FRANK, supra note 3,
at 4.
6. CUTLACK, supra note 3, at 46; CARNEGIE & FRANK, supra note 3, at 148.
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conflict in an untamed landscape The Boers met their match in
these Bush Veldt Carbineers, and the ruthless renegade Captain
Breaker Morant.'
The Boers resorted to tactics such as stripping the khaki
uniforms from dead British soldiers and infiltrating the English
forces and orchestrating ambushes through the display of false flags
of surrender.9 In order to combat these maneuvers, commander-in-
chief Lord Herbert Kitchner ordered the execution of Boers
captured while wearing British uniforms.10 This later was amended
to provide that no quarter should be extended to Boers." Although
these orders elicited some concern, there is no indication that
punishment was meted out to British officers who executed Boers."
Morant learned, in August 1901, that his close friend, Captain
Frederick Hunt, had been abused, savaged and killed by a band of
Boers.'3 A grief-stricken Morant immediately pursued the perpe-
trators and apprehended the Boer Visser, who was wearing Hunt's
clothes.1 4 Morant ordered Visser's execution and reported the
killing to his superiors.15 Morant later apprehended eight other
Boers who also were killed. 6 The shooting was inadvertently
witnessed by a German missionary, the Reverend C.A. Daniel
Hesse, who himself was subsequently found shot to death. 7 Several
weeks later, on September 12, three additional Boers were detained
and killed by Morant's men.' Morant seemingly redeemed doubts
concerning his character and courage when roughly two weeks later
he captured the notorious Boer commando Cornet Kelly along with
nine of his men.19
Despite Great Britain's military success, she was subjected to
increasing international criticism for the tactics and strategies
deployed in the South African campaign, most notably from
Germany. In an effort to palliate public opinion and to assuage
7. CUTLACK, supra note 3, at 48-50
8. Id. at 55.
9. Id. at 48.
10. CARNEGIE & FRANK, supra note 3, at 83.
11. CUTLACK, supra note 3, at 62, 86.
12. Id. at 57-58; CARNEGIE & FRANK, supra note 3, at 64.
13. CUTLACK, supra note 3, at 61-62.
14. CARNEGIE & FRANK, supra note 3, at 82.
15. CUTLACK, supra note 3, at 63-64.
16. Id. at 66.
17. Id. at 67.
18. Id. at 67-68.
19. Id. at 69-70.
20. CARNEGIE & FRANK, supra note 3, at 111-12.
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anger over the death of Hesse, Morant and two other Australian,
officers were arrested in October 1901.21
Morant testified at trial that Visser had been wearing Captain
Hunt's clothes and that he followed Kitchner's command and
summarily executed the prisoner.22 In addition, Morant insisted
that Captain Hunt admonished that prisoners were not to be
brought in alive.' He noted that the authorities clearly count-
enanced his conduct since there had been no response or reaction
to reports of the killings. Morant also noted in mitigation that he
only took these extreme measures following the death of his
comrade Captain Hunt.' The Breaker's Australian attorney, Major
J.F.Thomas, argued that Morant reasonably believed that he was
acting pursuant to orders issued by his superiors and that while he
perhaps should be subject to censure, that he was not deserving of
criminal punishment. 6 Thomas further contended that the Bush
Veldt Carbineers had been assigned to combat the terror tactics of
marauding Boer bands and waged war under a separate set of legal
expectations and standards.27 The Crown Prosecutor responded
that Morant carried out an obviously illegal and improper
command and should be subjected to a severe sentence.' The fact
that the Boers disregarded the directives of the code of conflict did
not justify the retributive response of summarily executing
prisoners.29 Morant's military inexperience and lack of under-
standing of the requirements of the humanitarian law of war did not
constitute a legal defense.3 °
Morant was adjudged guilty of murder and sentenced to death
in February 1902.31 He subsequently was indicted and convicted
along with two others for the killing of the eight Boers. Morant
and Lieutenant Peter Handcock, however, were acquitted of the
murder of the missionary Hesse.33 Commentators have speculated
that Morant and Handcock, in fact, were executed for their
21. Id. at 111.
22. Id. at 116-27.
23. Id. at 117.
24. Id.
25. CARNEGIE & FRANK, supra note 3, at 111-12.
26. CUTLACK, supra note 3, at 83.
27. Id. at 86.
28. Id. at 83-84.
29. Id. at 86-87.
30. Id. at 84.
31. CARNEGIE & FRANK, supra note 3, at 118-19.
32. Id. at 126.
33. Id. at 134-35.
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suspected involvement in the killing of Hesse since other British
units routinely shot prisoners without suffering recrimination.'
Handcock wrote his sister on the eve of his execution and stated the
following: "I obeyed my orders and served my King as I thought
best."35  In order to mute potential protest, the English did not
inform the Australian government of the executions for seven
weeks.'
The trial of Breaker Morant presents the issue whether a
soldier should be exonerated in those instances in which he or she
obeys commands which later are adjudged to have clearly
contravened the law of war. What is the standard for determining
whether a combatant should have been, or was, aware of the
illegality of a superior order? Did not the orders to kill prisoners
appear legal in light of the tactics and strategies during the Boer
War? Can reason and rationality be demanded of combatants
given the pressures of armed conflict? Should responsibility be
limited to those who issued the orders or shared equally by
individuals in the higher and lower-levels of command? Is it
equitable to hold a lower-level and inexperienced combatants
responsible for comprehending the encyclopedic code of conflict
and deciphering the legality of orders? Should there be a distinc-
tion between combatants, such as Morant, who are not under
immediate pressure to abide by orders and soldiers confronting
immediate retribution for disobedience? Does the trial of ordinary
combatants provide a politically palatable scapegoat for
authorities? In the end, should superior orders be a complete
defense, plea in mitigation, or of no significance absent a demon-
stration of duress or mistake of fact? 37
This essay traces the development and debate over the defense
of superior orders over the course of the last century. The doctrine
has preoccupied and bedeviled philosophers and jurists and is of
significant practical import since it promises to be increasingly
relied upon by defendants confronting prosecution before the
newly-formed international criminal courts.38
34. Id. at 64, 148-49. There is evidence that Morant and Handcock killed
Hesse. Id. at 149-50.
35. Id. at 165. On January 23, Morant and Handcock were released from
confinement in order to assist in defending the town of Pietersburg against a Boer
attack. They helped to repel the Boers and then were returned to prison.
CUTLACK, supra note 3, at 78-79.
36. CUTLACK, supra note 3, at 18.
37. See supra notes 3-36 and accompanying text.
3A See Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, A/Conf. 1839
(1998), reprinted in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
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I. An Early Precedent
The 1474 trial of Peter of Hagenbach, Charles of Burgundy's
Governor of Breisbach, is considered the progenitor of modern war
crimes trials. 9 The Archduke of Austria pledged his possessions on
the Upper Rhine, including the fortified town of Breisbach, to
Charles on the condition that Charles respect the liberties of the
towns and inhabitants.'° Charles had no intention of returning
these territories, refused repayment of the Archduke's debt and
directed Hagenbach to implement a policy of repression designed
to eliminate opposition.4 Austria formed a coalition with Berne,
France and with the towns and knights of the Upper Rhine,
captured Breisbach and subjected Hagenbach to trial."
Austria presided over the tribunal which consisted of twenty-
eight judges from allied towns. 3 The accused was charged with
violating the laws of God and man through murder, rape, perjury
and other depredations." Hagenbach's representative responded
that the defendant's only judge and master was the Duke of
Burgundy and that as a soldier that he lacked the standing and
status to question the Duke's demands.45 The Tribunal rejected this
defense on the grounds that it contravened the law of God.'
Hagenbach was stripped of his knighthood and executed; Charles
was subsequently defeated and killed in the Battle of Nancy of
1477.47
This judgment undoubtedly was influenced by the partisan
predisposition of the panel. The reference to the laws of God and
man nevertheless suggested that there were transcendent rules
which took precedent over those promulgated by even the most
elevated member of the aristocracy. ' As illustrated in the following
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 39 (M. Cherif Bassiouni comp., 1998) [hereinafter Rome
Statute].
39. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, II INTERNATIONAL LAW AS APPLIED BY
INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 462
(1968).
40. Id.
41. Id. at 463-64.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 39, at 465.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See supra notes 39-48 and accompanying texts. Hagenbach's plea was
consistent with various authoritative statements of law. The Justinian Digest states
that "'any person who, in war, commits any act forbidden by his commander, or
fails to obey his orders, shall suffer death, even if his mission be successfully
[Vol. 20:1
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sections, this decision's constrained conception of the prerogatives
of sovereignty anticipated the twentieth century jurisprudence of
superior orders.
II. World War I
A. Competing Perspectives on the Superior Orders Defense
The weight of scholarly opinion was that English, French and
American law insulated a subordinate officer who acted in accord-
ance with superior orders from criminal prosecution. 9 The leading
treatise on international law authored by Professor Lasa
Oppenheim, the Whewell Professor at Cambridge, pronounced that
"[i]f members of the armed forces commit violations by order of
their Government, they are not war criminals and may not be
punished by the enemy."'
Professor Oppenheim drafted the provision of the British
Manual of Military Law on superior orders issued in 1914 and
reprinted in 1917."' Article 443 asserted that members of the armed
forces who violated the recognized rules of war in compliance with
the orders of their government or commander "are not war
criminals and cannot therefore be punished by the enemy.
5 2
Article 443 further provided that individuals issuing illegal orders
accomplished."' L.C. Green, The Defence Of Superior Orders In The Modern Law
Of Armed Conflict, 31 ALBERTA L. REV. 320, 321 (1993). The Articles of War
promulgated by Richard II in 1385 provided that "'every one be obedient to his
captain ... under penalty of losing his horse and armor."' Id. James II, in 1688,
stated that "'if any inferior officer or soldier shall refuse to obey his superior
officer ... he shall be cashiered, or suffer such punishment as a Court Martial shall
think fit."' Id. Similar provisions also appeared in the military instructions issued
under the authority of Emperor Maximilian, those issued by Robert Earl of
Leicester, when commanding the Netherlands and English forces in 1586, and in
the Letter of Articles on Military Discipline promulgated under the auspices of
Prince Maurice of Orange which remained in force until 1799. Id. The superior
orders plea also was unsuccessfully invoked by the commander of the guard as a
defense to the charges of murder and treason stemming from the killing of King
Charles I. The Court ruled that obedience to a traitor's order also was traitorous.
See Jeanne L. Bakker, The Defense of Obedience to Superior Orders: The Mens
*Rea Requirement, 17 AM. J. CRIM. L. 55 n.2 (1989).
49. See George Gordon Battle, The Trials Before the Leipsic Supreme Court of
Germans Accused Of War Crimes, 8 VA. L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1921).
50. LASA OPPENHEIM, II INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE: WAR AND
NEUTRALITY 310 (2nd ed. 1912)
51. George A. Finch, Superior Orders and War Crimes 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 440,
441 (1921).
52. Id. Redress was to be through "other means," presumably reprisals. Id.
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were subject to criminal punishment.53 This provision was adopted,
with only slight modification, as Article 336 of the Rules of Land
Warfare approved by the General Staff of the United States Army
and issued in April 1914."4 Article 336 provided, in part, that
members of the armed forces may not be punished for offenses
"committed under orders or sanction of their government or
commanders. The commanders ordering the commission of such
acts... may be punished by the belligerent into whose hands they
may fall."55
Former naval commander Sir Graham Bower, in a talk before
the English Grotius Society in 1915, endorsed Oppenheim's view as
emblematic of prevailing international law doctrine.56 Bower
condemned as cruel and inhumane the German submarine fleet's
attacks on merchant vessels under circumstances in which it was
impossible to save the passengers and crew. 7 However, he stressed
that according to prevailing military law that "the blame does not
rest with them [submarine commanders], but with their superiors.,18
Bower noted that subordinates typically lacked sufficient inform-
ation to make a reasoned judgment and that even an order which
appeared to be facially invalid may constitute a justifiable reprisal. 9
He concluded that holding a subordinate officer "responsible is to
strike at the foundations of discipline in every army or navy in the
world."
Dr. Hugh Bellot, who in 1918 would be named secretary of the
British government's war crimes commission, responded in a
presentation to the Grotius Society. 6' Bellot stressed that the
British Manual of Military Law was an advisory statement of the
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. Some significant textual distinctions between the American and British
text are discussied in Alexander N. Sack, Punishment of War Criminals and the
Defence of Superior Orders, 80 L.Q. REV. 63, 66 (1944). French law is briefly
discussed in Battle, supra note 49, at 24. The previous American rule was that a
"superior officer cannot order a subordinate to do an illegal act and if a
subordinate obey such an order and disastrous consequences result, both the
superior and the subordinate must answer for it." The Trial of Captain Henry
Wirz for Conspiracy and Murder (Washington D.C., 1865), 8 AMERICAN STATE
TRIALS 657, 823 (1917).
56. Graham Bower, The Laws of War: Prisoners of War and Reprisals, in I
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC'Y 15, 24 (1916).
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 25.
60. Id.
61. Hugh H. L. Bellot, War Crimes: Their Prevention and Punishment, in II
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS Soc'Y 31 (1917).
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law and possessed no statutory force or authority.62 The excul-
pation of subordinates would "make wastepaper of the whole
chapter."63  This would mean that only the Kaiser would be
criminally culpable, and an international tribunal was not likely to
indict an individual of the Kaiser's stature and transform him into a
martyr.6  Bellot queried whether it could be credibly contended
that a lower-level officer, who acted under orders and directed his
men to shoot non-combatants without trial, was not a war criminal?
What of the officer in command of the German U-boat which
torpedoed the civilian ship, the Lusitania, and sent 1,200 non-
combatants to their death?6 Bellot urged the British government
to clearly proclaim that all those involved in war crimes would be
brought to the bar of justice.'
Commentators observed that any German insistence that the
Allies respect superior orders in prospective war crimes trials had
been compromised by the conviction and execution of English
Captain Charles Fryatt.67 Fryatt directed his merchant vessel to ram
an approaching German submarine which was forced to submerge
to avoid a collision.68 He was convicted by a German court martial
of terrorism despite the fact that scholars noted that Fryatt's actions
were in conformity with the instructions of the British Admiralty
and consistent with international law.69
Anglo-American judicial opinion in claims of civil liability was
divided on the defense of superior orders.0 In the Flying Fish, the
commander of a naval vessel, in accordance with instructions issued
by the President of the United States, seized a Danish brigantine
62. Id. at 46.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 49.
66. Bellot, supra note 61, at 49. English commentator C.A. Hereshoff Bartlett,
would insulate subordinates from liablity for having carried out legal orders. He
suggested that this immunity would be lost in cases in which a combatant engaged
in "wanton, cruel and unnecessary crime," suggesting that the subordinate must
engage in an "intentional" and "willful" wrong. C.A. Hereshoff Bartlett, Liability
for Official War Crimes, 35 L.Q. REV. 177, 189, 191 (1919). George Finch noted
that a recognition of the superior orders defense would undermine efforts to
enforce provisions of the law of war designed to humanize armed conflict. George
A. Finch, Superior Orders and War Crimes, 15 AM. J. INT'L L. 440, 445 (1921).
67. See Edwin Maxey, The Execution of Captain Fryatt, 37 CANADIAN L.
TIMES 456 (1917).
68. See James Brown Scott, The Execution of Captain Fryatt, 10 AM. J. INT'L L.
865-66 (1916).
69. Id. at 876-77.
70. See Finch, supra note 66, at 442.
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which was sailing from a French port." The Act of Congress under
which the President promulgated the order only authorized the
seizure of vessels sailing to French ports.72 Chief Justice John
Marshall, held that the seizure lacked legal authorization and that
the commander was responsible for the resulting damages.73
Marshall acknowledged that he previously believed that subor-
dinates should be immune from civil liability in those instances in
74which a vessel had been seized pursuant to the order of a superior.
He explained that his view was based on the indispensability of
organizational discipline.75 Marshall, however, explained that "I
acquiesce in that [the view] of my brethren, which is, that the
instructions cannot change the nature of the transaction, nor
legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a
plain trespass. Chief Justce Roger Taney reiterated the same
position in Mitchell v. Harmony, in 1851, and noted that "it can
never be maintained that a military officer can justify himself for
doing an unlawful act, by producing the order of his superior. The
order may palliate, but it cannot justify."7
A contrary view was articulated by Justice Joseph Story, in
Martin v. Mott in 1827, when he opined that a "prompt and
unhesitating obedience to orders is indispensable" and that "every
obstacle to an efficient and immediate compliance" poses a threat
to the public interest. Story stressed that hesitation, pause and
procrastination may undermine military effectiveness and efficiency
and lead to disaster and depredation.79 The fear of legal liability for
following orders "would be subversive of all discipline, and expose
the best-disposed officers to the chances of ruinous litigation. '
Officers and combatants would demand access to confidential and
classified information in order to protect themselves from penal
prosecution.81
71. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170 (1804).
72 Id. at 176-78.
73. Id. at 179.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Barreme, 6 U.S. at 179.
77. Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 137 (1851) (seizure of
property belonging to an American commercial trader by the United States
military during the Mexican-American war). See also United States v. Carr, 25 F.
Cas. 305 (Case no. 14, 732) (1872).
78. Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 30 (1827).
79. Id.
80. Id. at 30.
81. Id. at 31.
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Courts recognized that the polar positions which viewed
superior orders as either a defense or as of no legal significance
failed to calculate the complexity of the issue.' Some domestic
courts responded by narrowing subordinate liability to those
instances in which a soldier carried out a command "which he
knows, or ought to know, to be illegal."'83 This was limited, in
practice, to orders whose illegality was "apparent and palpable to
the commonest understanding."'8 The latter test was intended to
limit liability to instances in which subordinates acted "wantonly"
with a "criminal intent." 5  This discussion of superior orders
anticipated the debate over the prosecution of accused German war
criminals following World War I.
B. The Commission on Responsibility
The Preliminary Peace Conference at Versailles appointed a
Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and
on Enforcement of Penalties to determine responsibility for World
War I' The commission found that the war was premeditated by
Germany and Austria together with their Turkish and Bulgarian
allies.' However, the commission determined that the waging of
wars of aggression was not contrary to positive international law
and could not be made the subject of criminal prosecution.8' These
"gross outrages" against the "law of nations" and "international
good faith" were nevertheless sufficiently serious that they should
be subject to "formal condemnation" and a provision should be
made for future criminal sanctions.'
Germany and her allies were determined to have contravened
the laws and customs of war and humanity by engaging in the most
"cruel practices which primitive barbarism" could devise for the
82. See supra notes 70-81 and accompanying text.
83. See United States v. Jones, 26 F. Cas. 653, 658 (Case No. 15, 495) (1813).
84. In re Fair, 100 F. 149, 155 (1900).
85. Id. The leading early twentieth century English authority was R. v. Smith
(1900), 17 S.C. 561, 567-69 (Cape of Good Hope) cited in L.C. Green, supra note
48, at 324. The Court noted that "if the orders are not so manifestly illegal that he
[the subordinate] must or ought to have known that they were unlawful, the
private soldier would be protected by the orders of his superior officer." Id.
86. Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on
Enforcement of Penalties (1919), 14 AM. J. INT'L L. 95 (1920) [hereinafter
Commission on Responsibility].
87. Id. at 98, 107.
88. Id. at 118, 120.
89. Id. at 120.
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"execution of a system of terrorism."' The commission made the
unprecedented proposal that individuals, whatever their rank or
status, should be held criminally culpable for these acts.9 The
vindication of the laws and customs of war and the principles of
humanity would be incomplete in the event that the former Kaiser
was immunized from prosecution.92 There was little doubt in the
mind of the commission that the Kaiser and others in authority
were aware of and could have intervened to mitigate or to prevent
the barbarities committed during the war.93
States already were authorized under international law to bring
enemy belligerents to trial in accordance with their domestic
practices and procedures.9 ' The commission further recommended
the appointment of an international tribunal to preside over cases
in which an individual's criminal acts or orders affected the
nationals of several countries or in which multinational prosecu-
tions were considered advisable.95 The tribunal was to apply the
"'principles of the law of nations" which were to be drawn from the
"'usages established among civilized peoples, from the laws of
humanity and from the dictates of public conscience.""
The commission was unable to reach a consensus on superior
orders. The report argued that civil and military authorities should
not be relieved of responsibility by the fact that a superior had been
convicted of the same offense.9 At the same time, the commission
was reluctant to adopt a position on superior orders and advised
that "[i]t will be for the court to decide whether a plea of superior
orders is sufficient to acquit the person charged from
responsibility."98
The American representatives Robert Lansing and James
Brown Scott objected to the imposition of liability for violations of
the elementary principles of humanity.' The laws and customs of
90. Id. at 113.
91. Commission on Responsibility, supra note 86, at 116-17.
92. Id. at 117.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 121.
95. Id. at 121-22.
96. Commission on Responsibility, supra note 86, at 122.
97. Id. at 117.
9& Id. The commission suggested that extending liability to civilian and
military officials was a requisite for the recognition of the superior orders defense.
The panel noted that "the trial of the offenders might be seriously prejudiced if
they attempted and were able to plead the superior orders of a sovereign against
whom no steps had been or were being taken." Id.
99. Memorandum of Reservations Presented By the Representatives of the
United States to the Report of the Commission of Responsibilities. Id. at 127.
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war were a standard certain while prosecution for violation of the
varying, variable and undefined laws of humanity risked retroactive
punishment.'" This was particularly troubling when extended to
Heads of State who heretofore were deemed to be immune from
prosecution by foreign sovereigns.0 The Americans also expressed
reservations concerning the extension of criminal culpability to acts
of omission in those instances in which an individual lacked the
knowledge, authority and duty to intervene to prevent or to punish
criminal conduct."° In addition, Lansing and Scott recognized that
international law authorized States to bring accused war criminals
before existing national tribunals for acts directed against a State's
nationals or property. '03 However, they questioned whether the
Allied Powers could create an international tribunal with juris-
diction over acts which did not affect the countries represented on
the court. This newly constituted organ would be applying a novel
form of jurisdiction to enforce recently constituted laws and
penalties and would be retroactive in character and content.
104
The peace treaty with Germany incorporated provisions
providing for criminal prosecution."'
Germany recognized the right of the Allied and Associated
Powers to bring before military tribunals persons accused of
violating the laws and customs of war and pledged to hand these
individuals over for trial."° The accused were to be brought before
the relevant military or mixed military tribunals. 7 In Article 227,
the Allied and Associated Powers "publicly arraigned[ed]" William
II of Hohenzollern, the former Kaiser, for the heretofore unknown
"supreme offense against international morality and the sanctity of
treaties.""'s This provision preserved the sovereign legal immunity
of the former Kaiser by providing for a "special" international
tribunal which was to be guided by the "highest motives of
international policy" with a view towards "vindicating the solemn
obligations of international undertakings and the validity of
international morality..'..
100. Id. at 134.
101. Id. at 135.
102. Id. at 143.
103. Id. at 146-47.
104. Id. at 147.
105. Treaty Of Peace With Germany, 13 AM. J. INT'L L. 151 (Supp. 1919).
106. Id. art. 228.
107. Id. art. 229.
108. Id. art. 227.
109. Id.
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C. The Penal Senate of the German Supreme Court
The Allied Power sought the extradition of 890 alleged war
criminals." ° The fledgling Weimar regime objected that the trials
would fuel support for both the conservatives and communists and
lead to the end of liberal democratic rule."' The Allied Powers
compromised and agreed to a revised list of forty-five individuals
who were to be tried before the Penal Senate of the German
Supreme Court at Leipzig."2
In the most prominent case involving the superior orders,
submarine commander Karl Neumann was acquitted of sinking the
hospital ship, Dover Castle. 3 At the time of the attack, the
hospital ship was transporting the sick and wounded from Malta to
Gibraltar; six members of the crew perished in the assault. 4 The
accused pled that Neumann acted in accordance with an order of
the German Admiralty which instructed that British hospital ships
in the Mediterranean were being utilized for military purposes and
should be targeted for attack."5
The Penal Senate relied on the provisions of German law
which required subordinates to obey superior orders and held that
commanders were solely responsible."6 The attack on the Dover
Castle did not fall within the two exceptions to this rule. The
accused had not gone beyond parameters of the order and had
taken extraordinary measures to limit injury and death."7 In
addition, Neumann relied on the memorandum issued by the
admiralty and believed that the attack was "not contrary to
international law" and constituted a "legitimate reprisal.""... He
dutifully reported the assault on the Dover Castle, lending credence
to the conclusion that Neumann viewed the attack as legally
110. JAMES F. WILLIS, PROLOGUE TO NUREMBERG, THE POLITICS AND
DIPLOMATCY OF PUNISHING WAR CRIMINALS OF THE FIRST WORLD WAR 119
(1982).
111. Id. at 120, 125.
112. Id. at 128.
113. Judgment In Case of Commander Karl Neumann Hospital Ship "Dover
Castle" (1921), 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 704 (1922) [hereinafter Dover Castle]. See
WILLIS, supra note 110, at 135.
114. Dover Castle, supra note 113, at 705-06.
115. Id. at 706.
116. Id. at 707.
117. Id. The defendant was unable to issue a warning to the Dover Castle since
it was escorted by two warships. Neumann also allowed roughly ninety minutes to
elapse between the firing of the first and second torpedo to permit the evacuation
of the sick and wounded. Id.
118. Dover Castle, supra note 113, at 707.
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justified."9 The Leipzig panel stressed that the German rule was in
accord with prevailing legal principles of "all other civilized states,"
including England.'20
In a second prosecution, General Karl Stenger, a severely
wounded war hero, was exonerated of issuing orders to execute
wounded French prisoners of war.21  These commands were
transmitted and implemented by Major Benno Crusius.'" The
Court accepted Stenger's testimony that following the cessation of
hostilities that he heard isolated rifle shots from the French
wounded and excitedly and angrily remarked that these individuals
should be shot."2 Five days later, on August 26, 1914, as Stenger's
troops marched past on their way to battle, he testified that he
informally warned the formations that the French were known to
feign being wounded and then attack from the rear.124 Stenger
testified that he admonished that in such cases that the French were
to be considered armed belligerents and were to be shot.' 2' This
was characterized by the Court as a cautionary comment rather
than an explicit order which was not applicable to all wounded
enemy combatants126 and which was entirely consistent with the
requirements of international law."7 Stenger lashed out in the
courtroom against his accusers and swore that he had served his
country with honor and dedication.
2 1
Crusius transmitted and implemented what he believed was
General Stenger's order and joined several of his men in executing
a number of French wounded.'29  Other witnesses failed to
corroborate the issuance of the command.'" The Tribunal, at any
rate, noted that an order to execute prisoners would have been
illegal and should not have been carried out.' The Court, in
119. Id. at 708.
120. Id. at 707. A subordinate was liable in those instances in which he went
beyond the requirements of the order. A subordinates also was culpable as an
accomplice in the event that he knew that his superiors ordered him to undertake
an act which constituted a civil or military crime or misdemeanor. Id.
121. CLAUD MULLINS, THE LEIPZIG TRIALS: AN AccouNT OF THE WAR
CRIMINALS' TRIALS AND A STUDY OF GERMAN MENTALITY 151, 164 (1915). See
WILLIS, supra note 63, at 135.
122. MULLINS, supra note 121, at 152.
123. Id. at 153-54.
124. Id. at 162.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 164.
127. MULLINS, supra note 121, at 154.
128. WILLIS, supra note 110, at 136.
129. MULLINS, supra note 121, at 157-60.
130. Id. at 159.
131. Id. at 155, 160-61.
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convicting Crusis of negligent homicide and sentencing him to two
years in prison, determined that he acted under the mistaken
impression that Stenger promulgated such an order and, as a result
of Crusius' excited and nervous condition, was unable to appreciate
that this indiscriminate killing constituted "a monstrous war
measure, in no way to be justified."'' 2
Crusis also carried out General Stenger's alleged command of
August 26.133 The Court, again, refused to credit Crusis' account."'
Crusis, however, was acquitted based on the finding that at the time
that he was suffering from a "complete mental derangement,"
constituting "a morbid derangement of his mental faculties which
rendered impossible the exercise of his free volition."'3 5
In a third case, the steamer Llandovery Castle, while
transporting wounded and sick Canadian soldiers, was torpedoed
by a German U-boat.13 6 First-Lieutenant Helmut Patzig errone-
ously presumed without proof or authorization that the steamer
was ferrying troops as well as munitions.'37 At least three of the five
life-boats lowered into the sea survived the sinking of the ship.38
Patzig ordered an attack on the lifeboats which resulted in the
death of the occupants of two of the vessels.'39 In Patzig's absence,
charges were brought against Lieutenants Ludwig Dithmar and
John Boldt, who complied with Patzig's commands and fired at the
lifeboats." They were deemed to have lacked a specific criminal
intent to kill and were held liable as accessories. '
The Penal Chamber stressed that a superior officer issuing an
order violative of international law was solely responsible.42 A
combatant obeying such an order only was liable "if it was known
to him that the order of superior involved an infringement of civil
or military law.' ' 43 The subordinate may assume that a superior
order is consistent with international standards and is not obliged to
question a facially legal command.' Subordinates, however, may
132. Id. at 160-61.
133. Id. at 161-2, 165.
134. MULLINS, supra note 121, at 163-64.
135. Id. at 166.
136. Judgment In Case Of Lieutenants Dithmar And Boldt, (1921) 16 AM. J.
INT'L L. 708, 709-10 (1922) [hereinafter Llandovery Castle].
137. Id. at 710.
138. Id. at 711.
139. Id. at 719.
140. Id.
141. Llandovery Castle, supra note 136, at 721.
142. Id. at 721-22.
143. Id. at 722.
144. Id.
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incur liability in those instances in which "an order is universally
known to everybody.., to be without any doubt whatever against
the law."1 '5 The Penal Senate stressed that Patzig's order to fire at
defenseless individuals in lifeboats was one of those "rare" and
''exceptional" instances in which "it was perfectly clear" that an
order constituted a "breach of the law." '146 The command was
"universally known" to be contrary to "the law of nations.' ' 147 The
defendants, as professional naval officers, were well-aware of the
relevant law and were obligated to refuse to carry out the
command."'8
Two former high-ranking German naval officers testified that
the common "impression" in the German fleet was that an officer
who exceeded the limits of the law in the course of combat was only
answerable to his superiors. 49 The Court, however, noted that that
this did not mean that this view was shared by the accused." At
any rate, the sinking of the lifeboats was a calm and calculated
decision and was not undertaken during armed conflict. 5' The
Court further rejected that Patzig was prepared to enforce his
orders through threat or force; this would risk Dithmar and Boldt
disclosing the attack and result in Patzig's possible prosecution and
punishment."2
The Court stressed that Patzig was principally responsible for
the killings.' Dithmar and Boldt, of course, should have resisted
his orders, but the Tribunal recognized that this would have
required "a high degree of resolution" from individuals trained to
obey.54 The defendants' actions nevertheless were contrary to the
most basic ethical principles and constituted a taint on the German
submarine fleet.' Both were sentenced to four years in prison.'56
These convictions did not stand the test of time. In late 1925,
the prosecutor's office at Leipzig pronounced that it would not
pursue outstanding war crimes charges.57 A closed session of the
145. Id.
146. Llandovery Castle, supra note 136.
147. Id. at 721.
148. Id. at 722.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Llandovery Castle, supra note 136.
152. Id. at 722-23.
153. Id. at 723.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Llandovery Castle, supra note 136.
157. WILLIS, supra note 110, at 146.
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Penal Senate, in 1928, annulled the convictions of Dithmar and
Boldt.58 A few months following Adolf Hilter ascendancy to
power, in 1933, all war crimes convictions were quashed. 9
American George Gordon Battle rationalized that while "it shocks
our sense of justice that the monstrous war crimes of Germany
should go unpunished, it is perphaps best, in view of the interest of
all the world and the future generations that this should be so
rather than that further seeds of hatred between the nations should
be sown.""
In summary, the Penal Senate of the German Supreme Court
at Leipzig in Dover Castle held that a subordinate generally was not
culpable for carrying out a superior order.6 The subordinate was
liable in only those instances in which he or she went beyond the
parameters of the order or carried out a command which he was
aware contravened civil or criminal law. 2 Defendant Neumann
relied upon a memo issued by the German Admiralty and his
candor concerning the sinking of the hospital ship lent credence to
the conclusion that he believed that this was a legitimate reprisal. 63
In Llandovery Castle, the Penal Senate seemingly supplemented the
subjective intent standard and held that knowledge of illegality
would be imputed in instances of clear and conspicuous illegality."
The Penal Senate, in Crusis, held that the defendant's mistaken
belief that he was carrying out commands by executing prisoners of
war resulted in liability for negligent rather than intentional
homicide.' These three decisions appeared to balance the desir-
ability of military discipline with recognition that subordinates
possessed the responsibility to resist clearly and conspicuously
illegal demands and directives.'" The defendants' convictions for
negligent rather than intentional homicide and the relatively lenient
sentences suggests that the Penal Senate recognized that the
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Battle, supra note 49, at 17.
161. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
164. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. The trials of Turkish leaders
are discussed in Vahakn N. Dadrian, Genocide as a Problem of National and
International Law: The world War I Armenian Case and Its Contemporary Legal
Ramifications, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 221 (1989).
166. See supra notes 113-56 and accompanying text.
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defendants' punishment should be mitigated by the exigencies of
warfare, military discipline and their lack of clear criminal intent."'
III. World War II
A. Scholarly Opinion
The prospective international prosecution of German war
criminals stimulated scholarly debate over superior orders
defense.' 6'
Legal commentators remained divided. 69 Clyde Eagelton, in
1943, argued that it was "repugnant" to the average person to
punish subordinate soldiers who typically lacked knowledge
concerning the legal propriety of their actions and risked immediate
execution in the event of disobedience. 7 ° Eagelton noted that
limiting liability to high-level civilian and military officials did not
pose a bar to the prosecution of Nazi war criminals since charges
could be brought against subordinates who acted without
authorization or in contravention of orders or against officials who
formulated and planned Nazi atrocities."' He also contended that
the trials of low-level combatants who dutifully followed orders
would prove to be of only modest importance in the development
of the inchoate field of international criminal jurisprudence.'
Eagelton's views were echoed by noted international scholar
Hans Kelsen who, in 1943, wrote an essay in which he discussed the
167. See supra notes 132, 156 and accompanying text. The decisions on naval
warfare had an immediate influence. The Washington Conference on the
Limitation of Armaments, in 1922, drafted a treaty which abrogated the superior
orders defense. The instrument was not ratified. See A Treaty on Submarines and
Noxious Gases in Warfare, 16 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, art. 3 (Supp. 1922) (never
ratified) [hereinafter Submarines and Noxious Gases]. But the superior orders
defense was not incorporated into subsequent treaties regulating submarine
warfare. See Proces-Verbal Relating to the Rules of Submarine Warfare Set Forth
in Part IV of the Treaty of London on Apr. 22, 1930 reprinted in 31 AM. J. INT'L L.
661 (Supp. 1937).
168. See Declaration on German Atrocities (Oct. 30, 1943), VI Doc. AM.
FOREIGN POLC'Y 231 (1945) (commitment by the United Kingdom, United States
and Soviet Union to bring Nazi war criminals to trial).
169. See George Manner, The Legal Nature and Punishment of Criminal Acts of
Violence Contrary to the Laws of War, 37 AM. J. INT'L L. 407, 417-18 (1943)
(surveying the diverse international and municipal approaches).
170. Clyde Eagelton, Punishment of War Criminals By the United Nations, 37
AM. J. INT'L L. 495, 497 (1943).
171. Id.
172. Id.
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consequences of abrogating the superior orders defense.'73 Kelsen
noted the importance of discipline and unconditional obedience in
military organizations and argued that in such strict structures that
responsibility was suitably situated in the superior officials who
issued commands.'74 Combatants fighting for survival should not be
placed in the position of calibrating the legal status of commands."'
Kelsen recognized that the some States had abrogated the superior
orders defense in the case of manifestly illegal orders."6 However,
he queried whether soldiers could be expected to comprehend the
intricacies of international law.177 Kelsen also questioned the
impact of abolishing the defense, noting that the verdicts in the
Leipzig trials suggested that domestic courts were reluctant to
punitively punish subordinates.'78 As for transnational tribunals,
one English commentator doubted whether the international
community could accept sending hundreds of thousands of soldiers
to prison for carrying out commands.'79
The weight of scholarly opinion, however, favored a limitation
on the superior orders defense. Edwin Dickinson, in 1943,
lectured the American Association of International Law that a
failure to restrain the application of the defense would result in the
preposterous position that the "only war criminals available for
punishment are Hitler and Tojo, neither of whom is likely to be
available alive when the victory is finally won.'
8
'
Political scientist, Jacob Berger, in arguing against recognition
of the superior orders defense, noted that it would be absurd to
severely punish the occasional war crimes committed by otherwise
well-disciplined forces while absolving the perpetrators of
systematic atrocities carried out pursuant to superior orders."
Berger conceded that there might be circumstances justifying
recognition of superior orders in mitigation or as a complete
173. Hans Kelsen, Collective and Individual Responsibility in International Law
with Particular Regard to the Punishment of War Criminals, 31 CAL. L. REv. 530
(1943).
174. Id. at 556.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 557-58.
177. Id. at 558.
178. Kelsen, supra note 173, at 558.
179. Ernst J. Cohn, The Problem of War Crimes Today, TRANSACTIONS
GROTIUS SoC'y 125, 144 (1941)
180. See Quincy Wright, War Criminals, 39 AM. J. INT'L L. 257,272-73 (1945).
181. Charles Cheney Hyde, Punishment of War Criminals, 37 PROC. AM. SoC'Y
INT'L L. 39, 49 (1943) (comment by Edwin Dickinson).
182. Jacob Berger, The Legal Nature of War Crimes and the Problem of
Superior Orders, 38 AM. J. INT'L L. 1203, 1207 (1944).
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defense.183 However, the plea should not be accepted in those cases
in which an accused acted as part of a premeditated plan to destroy
a nation."
Professor Sheldon Glueck of Harvard, in his seminal statement
supporting the prosecution of Nazi war criminals, noted that the
principle of non-liability in the English and American military
manuals would "render impossible" the conviction of a large
number of Nazi war criminals.'85 A new rule was required which
struck a balance between the precarious position of subordinates
and the need to deter and to denounce brutality."8  Glueck
proposed to deny the superior orders defense in those instances in
which a subordinate actually knew or had reasonable grounds to
know of an order's illegality.187 This would include situations in
which the order was "'patently"' or "'manifestly"' or "'universally
known to be"' unlawful as well as less egregious situations. '8 In
such circumstances, Glueck advocated considering the order in
mitigation of punishment. 9 This would involve weighing and
balancing various facts and circumstances specific to the situation of
the accused."9
The events of World War I and II led to a slight modification
in the discussion of superior orders in Oppenheim's treatise.' The
fourth edition, in 1926, maintained that members of the armed
forces committing violations of the law of war pursuant to superior
orders were "not war criminals" and "may not be punished by the
enemy."' 2 A footnote recognized that the "contrary is sometimes
183. Id. at 1208.
184. Id.
185. SHELDON GLUECK, WAR CRIMINALS: THEIR PROSECUTION & PUNISHMENT
155 (1944).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 155-56.
18& Id. at 157.
189. Id. at 156-57.
190. GLUECK, supra note 185. These factors would include the age and
intelligence of the accused; his military rank; the amount of discretion exercised by
the subordinate; the nature and extent of the injury caused by obedience to the
illegal order; the clarity or complexity concerning the order's illegality; the
subordinate's instruction on the laws and customs of war; and whether the order
required instant obedience. Id. at 156-57.
191. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying texts. Id. at 145-57. In those
instances in which the Nazi-Fascist domestic law clashed with the well known
provisions of the law of nations respecting the rules and customs of legitimate
warfare or with almost universally accepted principles and criminal law, the latter
should take precedence. Id. at 158.
192. LASA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE: DISPUTES, WAR
AND NEUTRALITY 410 (4th ed. 1926).
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asserted,"'93 but that it was "difficult" to contend that "recent
events" had abrogated the immunity accorded to individuals acting
in accordance with superior orders since the "law cannot require an
individual to be punished for an act which he was compelled by law
to commit.'
194
The treatise was completely revised in the sixth edition, in
1944.9 The text recited that the fact that a rule of warfare has been
violated pursuant to a superior order does not "deprive the act in
question of its character as a war crime" or "in principle, confer
upon the perpetrator immunity from punishment by the injured
belligerent."'" A contrary view has "occasionally" been adopted,
but "it is difficult to regard it as expressing a sound legal
principle."'' At the same time, the treatise qualified this rule in
stressing that courts undoubtedly would consider that members of
the armed forces were obligated to obey military orders and that
combatants cannot be expected to scrupulously weigh the legal
merits of directives, particularly given the complex and
controversial nature of the rules of warfare. 98 An act otherwise
amounting to a war crime also may have been carried out in
obedience to an order characterized as a reprisal.'99 Oppenheim
thus concluded that the central governing principle was that
members of the armed forces "are bound to obey lawful orders only
and that they cannot therefore escape liability if, in obedience to a
command, they commit acts which both violate unchallenged rules
of warfare and outrage the general sentiments of humanity. 2°°
193. Id. at 410 n.2.
194. Id. at 410 n.2. The footnote cites in support Article 3 of A Treaty on
Submarines and Noxious Gases in Warfare, Washington Conference on the
Limitation of Armaments of 1922. Id. See Submarines and Noxious Gases, supra
note 167. But see Commission of Jurists to Consider and Report Upon the
Revision of the Rules of Warfare (1923), 32 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 11, art. 12 (1938)
(abrogating personal liability for radio operators). Oppenheim's statement was
criticized for failing to consider that the lawfulness of a command is a matter of
international rather than domestic law. Sack, supra note 55, at 67.
195. See LASA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, A TREATISE: DISPUTES,
WAR AND NEUTRALITY 453 (6th ed. rev. 1944).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. Oppenheim observed that political authorities are unlikely to
prosecute and punish war crimes committed by enemy belligerents during armed
conflict and risk retaliation against their own nationals. Id. He concluded that the
complexity of various surrounding "circumstances are probably in themselves
sufficient to divest the act of the stigma of a war crime." OPPENHEIM, supra note
195.
200. Id.
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Limiting liability to the individual issuing an order, in practice, may
concentrate responsibility on the head of the State "whose account-
ability, from the point of view of both international and
constitutional law, is controversial.
'20 1
Article 443 of the British Manual was modified to coincide
with Oppeheim's treatise. 2u The revised text, in part, provided that
"members of the armed forces are bound to lawful orders only
and.., cannot therefore escape liability, if in obedience to a
command, they commit acts which, both violate unchallenged rules
of warfare and outrage the general sentiment of humanity. '23 A
newly formulated American provision provided that individuals
who "violate the accepted laws and customs of war may be
punished therefor. However, the fact that the acts.., were done
pursuant to order of a superior or government sanction may be
taken into consideration in determining culpability . .. ,,20 There
was speculation that these amendments had been adopted in
anticipation of the trial of German and Japanese war criminals,
many of whom were likely to invoke the plea of superior orders.2 5
The operative rule of German military law during the Second
World War was set forth in Article 47 of the German Military Penal
Code of 1872, which also had been applicable during World War
I.2 This provided that the superior issuing an order was alone
responsible.' However, a subordinate was to be punished as an
accomplice in the event that he "went beyond the order given to
him" or "knew that the order of the superior involved an act which
201. Id.
202 See supra notes 51-53, 195-201 and accompanying text.
203. An Exposition of the Laws and Usage of War on Land art. 44 (1944)
quoted in Guenter Lewy, Superior Orders, Nuclear Warfare, and the Dictates of
Conscience: The Dilemma of Military Obedience in the Atomic Age, 55 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 3, 6 (1961). Professor Oppenheim's provision had been retained in the
military manual for over thirty years despite the fact that the Birkenhead
Committee of Enquiry on War Crimes, established by the British government in
1918, disputed the statement that a subordinate should never question an order.
The committee recommended that the plea of superior orders should not be
applied by courts which might be established to prosecute German war criminals
in those cases in which acts were "flagrantly" and "obviously" contrary to the laws
of war. See N.C.H. Dunbar, Some Aspects of the Problem of Superior Orders in the
Law of War, 63 JUR. REv. 234, 243 (1951).
204. Rules of Land Warfare sect. 345.1 (1944) quoted in Lewy, supra note 203,
at 6.
205. Id.
206. German Military Penal Code (1872) quoted in Dunbar, supra note 203, at
244. A comprehensive discussion of the statutory texts is contained in Mitchell
Franklin, Sources of International Law Relating to Sanctions Against War
Criminals, 36 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOL'Y 153, 1162-68 (1945).
207. Dunar, supra note 203, at 244.
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aimed at a civil or military crime or offense.""2 Professor Sheldon
Glueck of Harvard, in reviewing the German jurisprudence on
superior orders, argued that the prosecution must establish that the
superior's order "was in fact aimed at the commission of a crime"
and that the "subordinate actually knew that such was the
superior's intention in giving the illegal order."2' Knowledge was
imputed in those isolated instances in which a command contra-
vened a rule of international law which was simple and universally
known.2"° Glueck noted that the Germans' primary reliance on a
subjective standard made it "extraordinarily difficult" to convict
subordinates who invoked the superior orders defense, particularly
given the skepticism of German courts towards international law.1
He ruefully concluded that "the German rule is little better than
one which completely exempts from responsibility all subordinates
acting upon any orders of military superiors.
Joseph Goebbels, the former German Minister of Propaganda,
however, publicly dismissed the superior orders defense in 1944.
He argued that "it is not provided in any military law that a soldier
in the case of a despicable crime is exempt from punishment
because he passes the responsibility to his superior especially if the
orders of the latter are in evident contradiction to all human
morality and every international usage of warfare., 213 This state-
ment, which had been issued by Goebbels "to justify his call for the
civilian population to lynch Allied airmen, would later haunt the
defendants at Nuremberg.
214
The London International Assembly, established under the
auspices of the League of Nations, addressed the superior orders
defense.25 The Assembly adopted a resolution, in 1943, providing
that a subordinate may not invoke as a defense the fact that the
criminal act with which he is charged was undertaken in response to
20& Id.
209. GLUECK, supra note 185, at 153.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 154.
212. Id. This interpretation was shared by Sir George Cave, Head of the British
Home Office. Sir George Cave, War Crimes and Their Punishment, 8
TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC'Y XIX, XXII (1923). Lord Cave noted that the
qualification on the superior orders defense "is so closely guarded that it might as
well not exist." Id.
213. Lewy, supra note 203, at 7.
214. Id.
215. UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, HISTORY OF THE UNITED
NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAWS OF
WAR 99 (1948) [hereinafter WAR CRIMES COMMISSION].
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the order of a superior."6 Courts, according to the resolution, were
entitled to acquit or to mitigate the punishment of an accused
compelled to follow superior orders and to commit a crime. 217
However, this exculpating or extenuating circumstance should be
disregarded when the act was so "obviously heinous" that it was
''revolting [to] the conscience of an average human being" or when
at the time of the offense the accused was a member of an
organization "whose membership implied the execution of criminal
orders.
, 218
This was refined by Professor Hershel Lauterpacht in a
comprehensive study undertaken for the International Commission
for Penal Reconstruction and Development, an organization of
English and European scholars and jurists.219 Lauterpacht proposed
that an accused who acted in good faith on the basis of superior
orders either should be deemed to possess "no liability" or
"diminished liability."22° This would not pertain in the case of
orders which were "clearly illegal" to "any person of ordinary
understanding by reference to generally acknowledged principles of
international law. 221 At the same time, a combatant obeying an
"illegal order which is not on the face of it unlawful" under the
threat of military discipline should be acquitted on the grounds of
superior orders.222
The United Nations, in 1943, established a Commission for the
Investigation of War Crimes. 3 After substantial debate and
consideration of the standard adopted by the London International
Assembly,224 the commission resolved that "it can[not] usefully
propound any principle or rule" in light of the fact that States have
adopted various standards on superior orders and that the extent of
exoneration or mitigation depended on the circumstances of a
particular case.225 The War Crimes Commission, however, unani-
mously agreed that "the mere fact of having acted in obedience to
216. Id. at 275.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 94-95, 275-77.
220. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 215, at 277.
221. Id.
222 Id. See also H. Lauterpacht, The Law of Nations and the Punishment of
War Crimes, 1944 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 58, 69-74.
223. WAR CRIMES COMMISSION, supra note 215, at 127.
224. Id. at 278-79.
225. Id. at 280.
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the orders of superior does not of itself relieve a person who has
committed a war crime from responsibility. 2 26
Calls for the continuance of the superior orders defense221 came
under increasing attack by scholars favoring a limitation on the
plea.' This was reflected in Oppenheim influential treatise which
was modified to provide that the fact that a combatant committed a
war crime pursuant to superior orders did not relieve him from
legal liability for contravening an unchallenged component of the
law of war.22 ' This led to a limitation on the superior orders defense
in the British230 and American manuals on humanitarian law."
German law, however, remained resistant and maintained a largely
subjective statutory standard.232 In anticipation of the Nuremberg
trials, both non-governmental assemblies233  and international
organs3 supported abrogating the defense in the case of orders
which were clearly contrary to the law of war.233 In other instances,
superior orders might be variously considered as part of a plea of
mistake of fact or duress.2 This debate and discussion set the stage
for the formulation of an international standard on superior orders
at Nuremberg.
B. The Nuremberg Standard
Justice Robert Jackson, the United States chief counsel in the
prosecution of the principal Axis war criminals at Nuremberg,
articulated the American position on superior orders in a 1945
memorandum to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.237 Jackson
noted that the doctrine of immunity of heads of state typically was
coupled with the superior orders defense.' He observed that the
combination of these two doctrines "means that nobody is
226. Id.
227. See supra notes 170-79 and accompanying text.
22& See supra notes 181-90 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 202-03 and accompanying text.
231. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
232 See supra notes 206-12 and accompanying text. But see supra note 210 and
accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 217-22 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 223-26 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 218, 221 and accompanying text.
236. See supra notes 217, 222, 226 and accompanying text.
237. Report to the President by Mr. Justice Jackson, June 6, 1945, in REPORT OF
ROBERT H. JACKSON, UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIALS 42 (1945) [hereinafter JACKSON REPORT].
238. Id. at 47.
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responsible." 9 Jackson insisted that society "as modernly organ-
ized cannot tolerate so broad an area of official irresponsibility."2'
He conceded that there doubtlessly were circumstances in which
the superior orders defense should be recognized. For instance, a
conscript or enlisted soldier assigned to a firing squad should not be
held responsible for an unjustifiable execution.241 The defense,
however, should not pertain in those instances in which individuals,
as a result of their rank or the nature of their orders, exercised
discretion. 2 Superior orders also should not be applied in those
instances in which an individual voluntarily and knowingly enlisted
in a criminal or conspiratorial organization, such as the Nazi
security police."3 Jackson proposed that judges weigh the facts and
circumstances in each instance and initially determine whether to
recognize the superior orders defense and then whether to apply
the plea in exculpation or in mitigation.2"
This formed the basis of the American proposal presented to
the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union at the 1945
London conference convened to establish an international military
tribunal.2 5 Article Eleven of the United States draft stated that the
fact that a defendant acted pursuant to the "order of a superior or
government sanction" shall not constitute an absolute defense but
may be considered either in "defense or in mitigation of punish-
ment if the tribunal before which the charges are being tried
determines that justice so requires."" This subsequently was
slightly modified to clarify that superior orders might be considered
as either a legal defense or in mitigation, depending on the
circumstances of the case.247 A Soviet proposal provided that
superior orders shall not limit a defendant's responsibility, but "[i]n
certain cases when the subordinate acted blindly in carrying out the
orders of his superior, the Tribunal has a right to mitigate the
punishment of the defendant.",2 8 A sub-committee amended the
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. JACKSON REPORT, supra note 237.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. American Draft of Definitive Proposal, Presented to Foreign Ministers at
San Francisco, April 1945, in JACKSON REPORT, supra 237, at 22.
246. Id. at 24,91 11.
247. Revision of American Draft of Proposed Agreement, June 14, 1945. Id. at
55, 58, 1 15.
248. Draft Showing Soviet and American Proposals in Parallel Columns. Id. at
165, 181, art. 29.
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American proposal in accordance with the Soviet alternative.249
This draft formed the basis of the final version incorporated into
the Nuremberg Charter and stated that the fact that a defendant
acted pursuant to the order of a superior or government sanction
"shall not free him from responsibility but may be considered in
mitigation of punishment if the Tribunal determines that justice so
requires."25
Soviet representative General I.T. Nikitchenko later
questioned whether it was appropriate to recognize superior orders
as a mitigating factor in a document dedicated to the prosecution of
major war criminals."' These high-ranking officials typically were
not constrained by a chain of command and exercised a degree of
discretion."2 Sir David Maxwell Fyfe observed that there may be a
situation in which a defendant was threatened to be shot in the
event that he did not carry out an order and that in such
circumstances that the court might be willing to "let him off with his
life. 253 Sir David stressed that the "important part is that it should
not be an absolute defense. 254 Justice Jackson explained that the
United States contemplated utilizing the Nuremberg trial to
establish organizational criminality and then to bring charges
against lower-level members of groups such as the security police.255
He recognized that in these prospective trials that an individual's
rank and authority should be considered in affixing punishment.2 6
In summary, the Nuremberg standard seems to have been
intended to apply to high-level officials who, in general, exercised
sufficient discretion so as not to be subject to superior orders.5
There, however, might be exceptional cases involving lower-level
officials and combatants in which the defense might be recognized
in mitigation of punishment."8 Justice Jackson, in fact, suggested
249. Draft of Agreement and Charter, Reported by Drafting Subcommittee, July
11, 1945, in id. at 195, 197 art. 8.
250. Id. See also Redraft of Charter, Submitted by British Delegation, July 23,
1945 in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 237, at 348, 352, art. 8. See Agreement for
the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European
Axis Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, art.
8, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter Nuremberg Charter].
251. JACKSON REPORT, supra note 237, Minutes of Conference Session of July
24, 1945. Id. at 360, 367.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 368.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Jackson Report, supra note 237.
257. See supra notes 251-56 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
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that the superior orders provision had been included as a matter of
equity in the event that prosecutions were initiated against
individuals for organizational membership.
In his opening statement at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson noted
that the defendants had exercised considerable discretion and
power and could not credibly shift responsibility to others.2 °
French prosecutor M. Francois De Menthon argued that orders
from a superior do not exculpate defendants who carried out a
"manifest crime from responsibility. Any other solution would...
be unacceptable, for it would testify to the impotence of all
repressive policy."26'
Defense attorney Horst Pelckmann conceded that Article
Eight of the Nuremberg Charter prohibited the defense of superior
orders in those instances in which a subordinate was aware of the
illegal character of an order.262 However, he also insisted that the
Charter must be interpreted to provide that an individual who
considered that his actions were "right and legal" should be
"exonerated. 263 Pelckmann argued that acceptance of the manifest
illegality standard proposed by De Menthon would lead to the
illogical result that an individual who committed an illicit act
without a criminal intent would not be subject to punishment. On
the other hand, an individual who carried out the same act in
response to a superior order would be subject to punishment by
virtue of the clearly criminal character of the command.26
Pelckmann also reminded the Tribunal that a superior order may
constitute compulsion and absolve a defendant from guilt.
265
A number of defendants invoked the superior orders defense
in their closing statements.26 They pled that at the time of their
service to the Reich that they believed that they were fulfilling their
259. See supra notes 255-56 and accompanying text.
260. 1I TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNAL 151 (1947) (opening statement of Justice Robert H.
Jackson).
261. V TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 418 (1948) (opening statement of M. Francois De
Menthon).
262. XXI TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS 626 (1948) (statement of Horst
Pelckmann).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. See XXII TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS 366-410 (1948) (statement of the
defendants).
20011
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
patriotic duty.267 Alfred Jodl, Chief of the Operations Staff of the
High Command, proclaimed that "I believe and avow that a man's
duty toward his people and fatherland stands above every other.
To carry out this duty was for me an honor, and the highest law." 2 8
British prosecutor Hartley Shawcross, in his closing statement,
replied that although the Charter provided that superior orders
might be recognized in mitigation2 69 that no rule of international law
accorded immunity to individuals who obeyed orders which were
"manifestly contrary to the very law of nature from which
international law has grown.""27 Prosecutor Shawcross proclaimed
that "[n]o one who chooses, as these men did, to abdicate their
consciences in favor of this monster [Hitler] of their own creation
can complain now if they are held responsible for complicity in
what their monster did.,
271
The judgment of the International Military Tribunal at
Nuremberg noted that international law imposed duties and
liabilities upon individuals as well as States.272 Crimes against
international law were committed by men, not by "abstract
entities," and only by punishing individual perpetrators can the
provisions of international law be preserved and enforced. 3
The Tribunal noted that most of the defendants claimed to
have acted in accordance with superior orders.274 Superior orders
were addressed in Article Eight which was in "conformity with the
law of all nations. 2 75 The Court noted that the fact that a soldier
was ordered to kill or torture in violation of international law has
never been recognized as a defense to acts of "brutality," but might
be recognized in mitigation.276 The Tribunal ruled that the "true
test[,] which is found in varying degrees in the criminal law of most
nations, is not the existence of the order, but whether moral choice
was in fact possible. 2 77 The Court later noted that those with full
267. See id. at 385 (statement of Wilhelm Frick).
268. Id. at 400.
269. 19 TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL
MILITARY TRIBUNALS 465 (1948).
270. Id. at 466.
271. Id. at 515.
272. United States v. Hermann Goring et. al., XXII TRIALS OF THE MAJOR
WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNALS 411, 465
(1948) [hereinafter Nuremberg Judgment].
273. Id. at 466.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 272.
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knowledge of Hitler's aims, who cooperated with Nazi regime, had
become partners in the Fuhrer's pernicious plans.278
The judgment specifically addressed Jodl's superior orders
claim. 9  Jodl directly reported to Hitler in planning the strategy
and conduct of military operations.' He initialed and issued
Hitler's orders for the invasions of Austria, Albania and Russia. 1
Jodl also circulated the Commando Order, which required the
summary execution of Allied combatants apprehended behind
German lines in Czechoslovakia, France, Italy and Norway. In
addition, he distributed an order from Hitler to evacuate and to
burn northern Norway2 3
Jodl testified that as a soldier that he was required to obey
Hitler's commands.' He claimed that he employed objection,
delay and subterfuge to frustrate orders with which he disagreed,
such as the directive to summarily lynch captured Allied pilots"'
and the Commando Order.2" The Tribunal, however, ruled that
"[t]here is nothing in mitigation[.] Participation in such crimes as
these has never been required of any soldier and he cannot now
shield himself behind a mythical requirement of soldierly obedience
at all costs as his excuse for commission of these crimes. '2  Jodl
was sentenced to death.28
Jodl's superior, Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the High Command
of the Armed Forces, also raised a superior orders claim.' Keitel
carried out commands to organize the aggressions against Austria,
Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, Greece and Yugoslavia and to
plan and direct the attack on Norway.2' In addition, he followed
Hitler's commands to distribute a number of relentlessly ruthless
directives, including the Commando Order.291 Keitel conceded that
he did not believe that this order was legal, but claimed that he
lacked the authority and power to impede Hitler's satanic
278. Id. at 468-69.
279. Id. at 568.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 569-70.
282. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 272, at 570.
283. Id. at 571.
284. Id. at 568.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 570.
287. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 272, at 571.
288. Id. at 589.
289. Id. at 533.
290. Id. at 533-34.
291. Id. at 533.
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schemes.29  Keitel also approved and implemented repressive
regulations concerning Soviet prisoners of war and dismissed the
objections of Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of the military
intelligence service, as arising from the antiquated "'military
concept of chivalrous warfare. This is the destruction of an
ideology. Therefore I approve and back the measures."'2 93 Keitel
distributed orders directing the killing of Russian political officers
captured during combat, the execution of civilians suspected of
offenses against German troops and passed on the infamous "Night
and Fog" decree, which authorized the secret deportation and trial
of Polish opponents of the Reich." He pled that as a soldier he was
properly positioned to invoke superior orders.295 The Court,
however, again noted that Article Eight precluded this defense and
stressed that superior orders cannot be considered in mitigation
"where crimes so shocking and extensive have been committed
consciously, ruthlessly, and without military excuse or justifica-tion.296 Keitel was sentenced to death.297
In summary, the Nuremberg decision interpreted Article Eight
to prohibit superior orders from being invoked as a defense; it was
limited to mitigation of punishment. 298 The Tribunal refused to
recognize superior orders as mitigating in the case of defendants
who carried out commands that were clearly contrary to the
humanitarian law of war.29  For instance, Erich Raeder,
Commander-in-Chief of the German Navy, was found guilty of
passing down the Commando Order with full awareness that it was
unprecedented to summarily execute combatants captured in
uniform.' Baldur von Schirach was convicted of continuing the
policy of deporting Jews from Vienna with knowledge that the
"best the Jews could hope for was a miserable existence in the
ghettos of the East."3 °1
A moral choice, it appears, was deemed to have been available
in those instances in which a defendant exercised a measure of
discretion and was not shown to have confronted immediate
292. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 272, at 534-35.
293. Id. at 535.
294. Id. at 535-36.
295. Id. at 536.
296. Id.
297. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 272, at 588.
298. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 287, 296 and accompanying text.
300. Nuremberg Judgment, supra note 272, at 563.
301. Id. at 565-66.
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retribution in failing to fulfill a command.' In most cases, the
defendants at Nuremberg enthusiastically embraced and extended
Hitler's polices. For instance, Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs
Joachim Ribbentrop was described as being in "complete
sympathy" with the main tenets of National Socialism and his
collaboration with the Fuhrer was "whole-hearted.,
30 3
The Nuremberg Tribunal thus introduced a voluntariness test.
An individual carrying out a clearly criminal command under
international law was considered culpable absent evidence that he
lacked moral choice and that his act was the product of duress or
coercion." This standard was subsequently endorsed by the United
Nations General Assembly."'
Various questions remained concerning the moral choice test.
How was the moral calculus to be measured? Is there not always a
choice whether to obey a command? At what point did the
potential harm to an individual refusing to obey the order outweigh
the harm resulting from the illegal order? Was a combatant
required to sacrifice his life? Must the threatened harm be
imminent or immediate? Should not a crime carried out in
response to coercion or threat be excused based on a lack of
criminal intent rather than merely mitigated? Was there a
differentiation between the justice standard in Article Eight and the
moral choice test articulated by the Court? Other than a lack of
moral choice what factors might mitigate punishment in the
interests of justice? The ill-defined moral choice test established by
the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg proved to have a
limited impact on courts adjudicating the fate of lower-level Nazi
combatants and officials.
C. American Prosecutions Under Control Council Law No. 10
Control Council Law No. 10 established a "uniform legal
basis" for the Allied Occupying Powers' prosecution of alleged
Nazi war criminals.07  The provision on superior orders was
302. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
303. Id. at 533.
304. See supra notes 276-77 and accompanying text.
305. See U.N.G.A. Res. 95(I), 188 U.N. Doc. A/64/Add. 1 (1946). This General
Assembly resolution affirmed "the principles of international law recognized by
the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the judgment of the Tribunal." Id.
306. See supra notes 279-97 and accompanying text.
307. Control Council Law No. 10 pmble, reprinted in VI TRIALS OF WAR
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL
COUNCIL LAW No. 10 XVIII (1952).
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modeled on the Nuremberg Charter and provided that "[t]he fact
that any person acted pursuant to the order of his Government or
of a superior does not free him from responsibility for a crime, but
may be considered in mitigation."308
The superior orders clause was first interpreted by a three
judge American panel in the Einsatzgruppen judgment. M The
Einsatzgruppen killing squads shadowed the Nazi troops as they
swept across Russia and ruthlessly carried out the Fuhrer Order,
which called for the summary execution of political opponents of
the Nazi regime. This resulted in the execution of over a million
Jews, Gypsies, disabled, homeless, mentally challenged individuals
and communist functionaries." '
At trial, Dr. Hans Gawlik, attorney for defendant Erich
Naumann, the Chief of Einsatzgruppe B, argued that the defend-
ants should be judged in accordance with the rules of international
law existing at the time of the acts alleged in the indictment.3
Neither the Nuremberg Charter nor Control Council Law No. 10
could change the pre-existing requirements of international law
established in transnational agreements and in the practice of
States."2
Gawlik contended that following World War I, the
Commission on Responsibility feared that defendants would
mechanically invoke the superior orders defense and, as a result,
recommended that the admissibility of the defense should be a
matter of judicial discretion. However, according to Gawlik, the
commission favored recognition of superior orders in those
instances in which an order was "incontestably" established.313 He
argued that since 1914, the defense had been recognized in the field
regulations of most armies.3"4 The British and American manuals,
308. Id. art. 4(b).
309. See United States v. Ohlendorf, IV TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10
411 (1950) [hereinafter Einsatzgruppen Judgment].
310. Id. at 412-16.
311. See Extract From the Closing Statement for Defendant Naumann, IV
TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS
UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10, 329 (1950) [hereinafter Einsatzgruppen
Materials].
312. Id. at 329.
313. Id. at 332. See Commission on Responsibility, supra notes 97-98.
According to Gawlik, formal recognition of the defense would have placed the
insurmountable burden of disproving the existence of the order on the
prosecution. The Commission thus determined that this should best be made a
matter of judicial discretion. See Einsatzgruppen Materials, supra note 311, at 332.
314. Id.
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prior to 1944, made no distinction between lawful and unlawful
orders; subordinates were instructed to obey rather than to
question commands."' Gawlik observed that "one cannot help
thinking that the [recent] amendment [of the British and American
military manuals] was evidently made in view of the impending end
of the war and the contemplated trials of war criminals."3"6 The
application of the Nuremberg standard to defendant Naumann
would be analogous to the retroactive laws utilized against
opponents of the Nazi regime, a practice which had been properly
condemned by the international community . 7
Gawlik urged the Tribunal to consider that "obedience has
been preached as the supreme duty" in Germany.318 This certainly
was the case under the National Socialist regime which required
individuals to be silent and supportive. 19 The Nuremberg notion
that subordinates possessed a duty to disobey illicit orders was
premised on the possibility of appealing to a superior. This avenue
of redress, however, did not exist in those countries in which orders
emanated from an all-powerful dictator who monopolized the
instruments of State power, such as Hitler.3 20
Defense attorney Dr. Willie Heim contended in his opening
plea for defendant Paul Blobel that those who refused to carry out
commands were condemned to concentration camps or summarily
executed.321 Defendant Otto Ohlendorf proclaimed that even
absent this threat that as a soldier he "surrendered... [his] moral
conscience" and was a "wheel in a low position.., of a great
machinery; and what... [he] did there is the same as is done in any
other army. 322  Defendant Erich Naumann, in his closing
statement, insisted that soldiers on both sides executed orders
which tested their conscience. Allied pilots must have possessed
qualms over killing 200,000 in the bombing of Dresden, reducing
the old town of Nuremberg to rubble and incinerating thousands of
civilians in the atomic bombing of Hiroshima." Defendant Blobel
seemed to capture the complexity of the defendants' self-described
dilemma when he observed that he had become caught in a conflict
315. Id. at 333.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 334.
318. Einsatzgruppen Materials, supra note 311, at 335.
319. Id.
320. Id. at 336.
321. Opening Statement for the Defendant Blobel, id. at 82, 87.
322 Extracts From the Testimony of the Defendants Ohlendorf Haensch and
Braune, id. at 203, 305
323. Final Statements of the Defendants, id. at 384, 394.
20011
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
between "law and morality, obedience and refusal to obey orders,
harsh necessity of war, and personal feelings.
3 24
The Einsatzgruppen Tribunal stressed that soldiers are
"reasoning agent[s]" and are not mere mechanical machines who
reflexively respond to orders. 5 Otherwise, the Tribunal noted that
the absurd situation could arise in which a sergeant could order the
corporal to shoot the lieutenant, the lieutenant could order the
sergeant to shoot the captain, the captain could order the lieutenant
to shoot the colonel, and, in each instance, the perpetrator would be
absolved from guilt.
326
Subordinates were required to obey only lawful orders and
could not plead superior orders in mitigation in those instances in
which they voluntarily and knowingly executed criminal
commands."2 A subordinate could not claim a lack of awareness of
an order's illicit character in those instances in which a command
was "manifestly beyond the scope of the superior's authority. 3
28
The Court clarified that to plead superior orders, an individual
must demonstrate an "excusable ignorance" of an order's "illegal
character.
'3 29
The defendants claimed that the Fuhrer Order was lawful.3
The defense distinguished between the order to shoot Jews and a
hypothetical order to execute all grey-eyed people on the grounds
that the Jews were the incubators and infectious instigators of
bolshevism and had been killed as an act of self-defense.33' The
Tribunal, however, questioned whether Russians were less inclined
to be communists than Jews.32  How does the defendants'
contention explain the incidence of well-known conservative Jews
throughout Europe? 333 Did Russian Jews, even if bolsheviks, pose
an imminent threat to Germany? 3 ' The Tribunal noted that
international law did not permit the killing of civilians based on the
fact that they were deemed dangerous. 35 This, were it not "so
324. Id. at 396.
325. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 309, at 470.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 470-71.
328. Id. at 471.
329. Id. at 473.
330. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 309, at 474-75.
331. Id. at 476.
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 464.
335. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 309.
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tragic," could "only be considered nonsensical. ' '336 The fact that the
order emanated from the Fuhrer was not controlling; Hitler was not
above international law.337
The Tribunal stressed that an individual was not required to
forfeit his life or to suffer serious harm in an effort to avoid carrying
out an obviously illegal order.338 A plea of duress in the execution
of a superior order required that an individual demonstrate that he
carried out a command to avoid the infliction of a "disproport-
ionally [sic] greater" harm.9 The threat must be "imminent, real,
and inevitable."'  A subordinate who shared the intent and
aspirations of a superior may not invoke the superior orders
defense. 3" Duress also may not be relied upon in those instances in
which the order could have been foreseen as the logical extension
of a program which was illegal at its inception. 2 The Nazi Party's
pernicious platform was clear and an individual involved in the
steady escalation of attacks against Jews "may not plead surprise
when he learns that what has been done sporadically; namely
murder, now is officially declared policy." 3'
In order to plead duress in mitigation, a subordinate may not
merely mentally rebel at the time the order is issued. Resistance
must be unrelenting and acquiescence at any point precludes the
plea of superior orders.' The defendants claimed to have been
stunned and shocked and to have internally objected to the Fuhrer
Order.45  The Tribunal determined that this was insufficient,
contending that a defendant who claimed to have been consti-
tutionally incapable of engaging in the slaughter generally would
have been assigned to other duties in order to insure the effective
and efficient murder of Jews. 6 Defendants could not assume that
336. Id. at 478.
337. Id. at 486
338. Id. at 480. In a statement which later would prove controversial, the Court
opined that "[n]o court will punish a man who, with a loaded pistol at his head, is
compelled to pull a lethal lever." Id.
339. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 309, at 471. It would not be an
adequate excuse, for example, if a subordinate, under orders, killed an individual
known to be innocent in order to avoid a few days confinement. An individual
may not claim duress once the threat of harm is removed. Id.
340. Id. at 480.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 309, at 481.
344. Id. Superior means superior in capacity and power to force a certain act; it
is not limited to rank. The latter presumably was meant to encompass the informal
exercise of authority, particularly in informal organizations. Id.
345. Id. at 481.
346. Id.
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protest would have proven profitless: "[n]o one can shrug off so
appalling a moral responsibility with the statement that there was
no point in trying." m' A soldier who sought to avoid such a terrible
task would not be a coward; he would simply be refusing to assume
the role of an assassin.48
Several defendants argued that it would have been futile to
refuse to implement the Fuhrer Order since their successors would
merely have carried out the command. 349 The Tribunal, however,
stressed that the defendants were responsible for their own
conduct. The actions of others was unknowable. Resistance may
have led to the withdrawal of the order or might have encouraged
combatants to refuse to cooperate. At the very least, innocent lives
would have been preserved for at least another day. 5°
Defendant SS Brigadier General Erich Naumann was head of
Einsatzgruppe B and contended that the Fuhrer Order already was
in effect when he assumed command.3 1 The Tribunal concluded
that the accused nevertheless was aware of the order and count-
enanced its continued implementation. 352 The Court observed that
the superior orders defense would be available in mitigation in the
event that Naumman was able to demonstrate that he did not agree
with the Fuhrer Order and was compelled by the chain of command
and fear of drastic consequences to kill innocent human beings. 53
Naumann, however, testified that "'I considered the decree to be
right because it was part of our aim of the war and, therefore, it was
necessary."'354 He also later stated that he "'saw nothing wrong
with the order, even though it did involve the killing of defenseless
human beings.',
355
SS Brigadier General Erwin Schulz was commander of
Einsatzkommando 5 which received orders to participate in the
execution of Jews.356 Schulz claimed that he opposed the order and,
on August 24, 1941, left for Berlin where he arranged to be
removed from his post in the latter part of September. Between
August 24 and 30, Einsatzkommando 5 executed 157 Jews and
347. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 309, at 482.
348. Id. at 485.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 517.
352. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 309.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 518.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 309, at 519.
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other Russians.358 The Court noted that the operation had been
planned prior to Schultz's departure and refused to accept his
absence as a defense. 9 It noted that "[t]he man who places a
bomb, lights the fuse, and rapidly takes himself to other regions is
certainly absent when the explosion occurs, but his responsibility is
no less because of that prudent nonpresence. ' '  The Court
mitigated Schulz's prison sentence to twenty years on the grounds
that although he undoubtedly was aware of the illegal nature of the
Fuhrer's commands that "confronted with an intolerable situation,
he did attempt to do something about it. 3 61 SS Brigadier General
Heinz Jost, Chief of Einsatzgruppe A, assumed command following
the implementation of the Fuhrer Order. 2 He nevertheless failed
to revoke the order and was aware of its continued implement-
ation.3 63 The Tribunal was unable to corroborate Jost's claim that
he had been recalled as a result of his refusal to order the execution
of Jews and had been demoted to sergeant and sent to the
frontlines.36' The panel recognized that after participating in mass
killings and the enslavement of civilians, Jost may have experienced
a moral transformation and protested and that while this was to his
"credit, it could not" wipe out the criminality which preceded his
withdrawal from the field.
'3 61
In sentencing SS Colonel Walter Blume to death by hanging, 366
the Tribunal expressed regret that such a "resolute person" coop-
erated in Hitler's callous campaign.367 The fact remains that "Hitler
with all his cunning and unmitigated evil would have remained as
innocuous as a rambling crank if he did not have the Blumes, the
Blobels, the Braunes, and the Bibersteins to do his bidding-to
mention only the B's." ' The Court pointed out that defendant SS
Lieutenant Colonel Gustav Nosske defied an order to shoot a
number of half-Jews in Duesseldorf, presumably because he
considered the victims to be Germans.369 The Tribunal noted that
this refusal "demonstrated, contrary to the argument advanced
35& Id.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 521, 588.
362. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 309, at 513.
363. Id. at 512-13.
364. Id. at 514-15.
365. Id. at 515. Jost was sentenced to life imprisonment. Id. at 587.
366. Id. at 588.
367. Einsatzgruppen Judgment, supra note 309, at 532.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 558.
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throughout the trial in behalf of the various defendants, that a
member of the German Armed Forces could protest a superior
order and not be shot in consequence." '37
The Einsatzgruppen judgment established that the superior
orders defense was available in those instances in which a
defendant was able to demonstrate excusable ignorance concerning
the illegality of an order.371  The Tribunal also recognized the
defense in mitigation in those instances in which a defendant
involuntarily carried out a command.372 The threat must have been
serious, sudden and substantial;3 73 human life may not be taken or
serious injury imposed in order to avoid a light and insignificant
harm.3 74  An individual who knowingly and voluntarily joined a
band of brigands could not later complain that he was compelled to
commit a crime.17' Defendants also could not credibly claim that
resistance was futile or that others would have merely carried out
the commands.3 76 The Tribunal pointed to the example of those
whose sentences were mitigated based on their timely and
successful efforts to withdraw from participation in Nazi
criminality.377
The American Tribunal in the Hostage case further refined the
parameters of the superior orders defense.3 78 The defendants were
charged with murdering hundreds of thousands of civilians in
Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania.17' The seizure and killings of
these innocent hostages was carried out in an effort to deter and to
defeat resistance in the Balkans.3" The Tribunal uncovered a
"record of killing and destruction seldom exceeded in modern
history. Thousands of innocent inhabitants lost their lives by means
of a firing squad or hangman's noose, people who possessed the
same inherent desire to live as do these defendants.,
38 1
On September 16, 1941, Adolf Hitler assigned defendant
Wihelm List to serve as Military Commander Southeast with a
370. Id. at 558-59.
371. See supra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
372. See supra notes 338-39 and accompanying text.
373. See supra note 340 and accompanying text.
374. See supra note 339 and accompanying text.
375. See supra notes 342-43 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 349-50 and accompanying text.
377. See supra notes 369-70 and accompanying text.
378. See United States v. Wilhelm List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW No. 10
1230 (1950) [hereinafter Hostage Judgment].
379. Id. at 1233.
380. Id.
381. Id. at 1254.
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mandate to suppress the insurgency in the Balkans.' Field Marshal
Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the Armed Forces,
simultaneously issued a directive which called for the death penalty
for fifty to one hundred "communists" in retaliation for the killing
of a single German soldier.3 83  List subsequently distributed the
order to his subordinate units. General Franz Boehme, appointed
to head German forces in Serbia, proceeded to direct his troops to
serve as "avengers" of the German dead and to create an "intimi-
dating example" and to "hit the whole population most severely." '385
Three days later, on September 28, 1941, Keitel ordered List to
insure that military commanders had hostages "at their disposal," at
least some of whom were from the leading personalities and
families in the occupied territories.38 On October 4, 1941, Keitel
also called for the collection in concentration camps of individuals
suspected of taking part in combat or supporting the partisans.387
These hostages were to be executed in the event of continued
armed resistance.3" At the same time, Boehme issued a reprisal
order for the execution of 2,100 Serbian internees. 3' The Chief of
the Security Police subsequently reported the killing of 2,200 Serbs
and Jews.39
List was succeeded by Lieutenant General Walter Kuntze in
October 1941.39 ' Kuntze continued the reprisal policy and issued an
order, in March 1942, proclaiming "[n]o false sentimentalities! It is
preferable that 50 suspects are liquidated than one German soldier
lose his life."3 2 He admonished that "soldiers who do not follow
orders and who do not act decisively are to be called to account. ' 93
Defense attorney Hans Laternser argued at trial that the plea
of superior orders was a widely recognized principle of inter-
national law as demonstrated by the works of leading international
writers and by certain provisions of the military manuals of the
United States and Great Britain.3' Laternser reiterated the
382. Id. at 1264.
383. Hostage Judgment, supra note 37&
384. Id. at 1265.
385. Id.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 1265-66.
388. Hostage Judgment, supra note 378, at 1266.
389. Id. at 1267.
390. Id. at 1268.
391. Id. at 1276.
392. Id. at 1277-78.
393. Hostage Judgment, supra note 378.
394. Opening Statement for Defendant List, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
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argument that this rule may not be revised by the unilateral action
of the victorious Allied Powers.9
The Hostage Court, however, ruled that members of the armed
forces are only bound to obey lawful orders and cannot escape
criminal liability in those cases in which they comply with
commands which violate international law and outrage funda-
mental concepts of justice."' A subordinate will not be deemed to
possess the requisite criminal intent in the event that he was not
aware of, and could not reasonably have been expected to have
been aware of, the illegal character of a command."9 The Tribunal
recognized that this rule compelled a commander to choose
between possible domestic punishment for disobedience and
sanction by the international community for committing a crime
against the law of nations.398 The judges nevertheless admonished
that to "choose the former in the hope that victory will cleanse the
act of its criminal characteristics manifests only weakness of
character and adds nothing to the defense."3 99 The Court explained
that absent this rule that belligerents would be bereft of protection
against the criminal conduct of enemy forces.'
The Tribunal dismissed Oppenheim's prior advocacy of the
superior orders defense as a "decidedly minority view."40' His
contention that a subordinate may not be punished for carrying out
an order overlooked that an illegal law cannot be considered a valid
enactment.402 The Court minimized the significance of the earlier
provisions of the British and American military manuals, noting
that these were neither authoritative legislative nor judicial
pronouncements; manuals at most may play an evidentiary role in
determining the existence of a custom or practice.' 3 The Court
noted that in any event, the army regulations of States were in
substantial conflict as to the defense of superior orders.'  The
Tribunal declared without citation that the abrogation of superior
No. 10 855, 859 (1950) [hereinafter Hostage Materials].
395. Id. at 864. Attorney Laternser distinguished between the domestic
application of superior orders within national jurisdictions and the prosecution of
alleged war criminals by an enemy. The latter was to be guided by the
requirements of international law. Id. at 862.
396. Id. at 1236.
397. Id. at 1237.
398. Hostage Materials, supra note 394, at 1236-37.
399. Id. at 1237.
400. Id.
401. Id.
402. Id.
403. Hostage Materials, supra note 394.
404. Id. at 1238.
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orders was a "fundamental rule of justice" which had found
"general acceptance" and that compliance with orders had never
been a "mandatory bar to the prosecution of war criminals." °5
Defendant List distributed the Keitel order of September 16,
1941 reciting the reprisal ratios for wounded or killed German
soldiers.' The Tribunal ruled that it was irrelevant whether this
was mandatory or directory, in either event the order illicitly
authorized a fixed retaliation ratio regardless of the nature of the
provocation.' There was no evidence that the hostages who had
been executed supported, shielded or assisted the partisans or were
residents of the areas from which attacks had been initiated.' The
Court concluded that international law vested "no such unre-
strained and unlimited power" in the commanding general of an
occupied territory, this was "nothing less than plain murder."
List was not relieved from responsibility by the fact that the
order emanated from the High Command of the Armed Forces.1 °
A subordinate officer was only bound to carry out lawful
commands: "[o]ne who distributes, issues, or carries out a criminal
order becomes a criminal if he knew or should have known of its
criminal character. '.' The Court stressed that a field marshal with
more than forty years of military experience certainly knew or
should have known of the criminal character of the command.412
List's awareness of the order's illegality is attested to by the fact
that he opposed the issuance of the command and reportedly did
what he could to lessen its impact.413 The Tribunal ruled that the
uncertainty created by the fact that the world community had
neglected to address the issues of hostages and reprisals to some
405. Id.
406. Id. at 1269.
407. Id.
408. Hostage Materials, supra note 394, at 1270
409. Id.
410. Id. at 1271.
411. Id.
412. Id.
413. Hostage Materials, supra note 394. List pled that he was absent from
headquarters and lacked knowledge of many of the killings. Absence from
headquarters does not constitute a defense. He may not, however, be charged
with acts committed on the order of another which were outside the basic orders
which he issued. An officer is required to rescind such illegal orders if time
permits; otherwise he is required to take steps to prevent the order from being
reissued. Id.
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extent mitigated List's guilt;41 ' he was sentenced to life imprison-
ment.' 5
Several officers attempted to ameliorate criminal commands
and, as a result, their sentences were mitigated. Ernst Dehner was
appointed Commander of the LXIX Reserve Corps in northern
Croatia at the end of August 1943.416 He issued a series of directives
which attempted to align German hostage and reprisal policies with
international law,4"7 admonishing that "[i]t is impossible to make use
of hostages for the execution of reprisal measures for the German
soldiers killed in the fight against bands. 4 1 8 As a result, his punish-
ment was mitigated to seven years imprisonment. 49  Defendant
Herbert Lanz, Commander of the XXII Mountain Corps, protested
an order to execute thousands of captured Italian combatants.420 He
also resisted a modified order to summarily shoot the entire officer
corps and instead organized a court martial which resulted in the
execution of the high-echelon command.42' The Court observed
that although Lanz succeeded in reducing the number killed, that
the execution of these ranking officers as terrorists still constituted
a war crime.422
The Hostage Tribunal once again affirmed that a subordinate
was required to obey only lawful orders and that superior orders do
not constitute a mitigating factor in the case of commands which
outrage fundamental concepts of justice.423 The Court noted that
this was a fundamental principle of justice which was consistent
with international law.424 Officers with the extensive experience of
the defendants certainly knew or should have known of the criminal
414. Id. at 1274.
415. Id. at 1318. Defendant Kuntze assumed command in the Southeast on
October 27, 1941. He was convicted of conveying orders to take reprisals. Id. at
1277-78. The orders "he issued and his subsequent failure to take steps to end
these unlawful killings after they had been reported to him makes him criminally
responsible under the law previously announced and applied in this opinion to the
defendant List." Id. at 1279. As a professional soldier with forty years experience,
he knew or ought to have known, that the killing of thousands under the guise of
carrying out reprisal measures when such measures "were legitimate in no sense of
the word made them crimes no matter what name was applied to them." Hostage
Materials, supra note 394, at 1281.
416. Id. at 1297.
417. Id. at 1299-1300.
41& Id. at 1300.
419. Id. at 1319.
420. Hostage Materials, supra note 394, at 1312.
421. Id.
422. Id. at 1313. Lanz was sentenced to twelve years in prison. Id. at 1319.
423. See supra notes 396-97 and accompanying text.
424. See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
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character of the hostage reprisal orders.425 Punishment might be
mitigated in those instances in which international law was
uncertain426 or in which an officer actively intervened to ameliorate
a criminal command.427
The issue of superior orders also was discussed in the High
Command case in which leading members of the Nazi officer corps
were convicted of executing a catalogue of criminal commands.
These included the Commando Order of October 1942, which
called for the execution of Allied commando units operating behind
German lines.429 The Tribunal concluded that this "was criminal on
its face. It simply directed the slaughter of these 'sabotage'
troops.' 4 3' The Commissar Order of June 1941 authorized the
execution of captured Soviet political operative attached to Russian
,.military units.431  This was characterized as "one of the most
obviously malevolent, vicious, and criminal orders ever issued by
any army at any time." 32 The Barbarosssa Jurisdiction Order was
issued in May 1941 and abolished the jurisdiction of military courts
over crimes committed by enemy civilians within the Russian
theater.433 Partisans and enemy civilians who attacked or were
suspected of having attacked German troops instead were subject
to summary execution.434 Collective punishment was to be carried
out against towns and villages from which assaults had been
directed at German troops.435
The Tribunal observed that the criminal acts condemned in
Control Council Law No. 10 were part of international common
law.436 A domestic directive to violate this standard was therefore
void and afforded no protection to individuals who carried out the
command. 437 The Court observed that the purpose of international
law was to channel and to control the conduct of States and that
this was most effectively accomplished through holding govern-
425. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
426. Sees supra note 415 and accompanying text.
427. See supra notes 417-19 and accompanying text.
428. United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb, XI TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS
BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW
No. 10 462 (1950) [hereinafter High Command Judgment].
429. Id. at 526-27.
430. Id. at 527.
431. Id. at 517.
432. Id. at 515.
433. High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 521.
434. Id.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 508.
437. Id.
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mental officials accountable. 38 It would be unrealistic and a legal
fiction to maintain that the State, rather than those who devised,
designed and implemented policies, was legally liable.439 Nor should
all sins and slanders be attributed to Hitler as the supreme legal
authority; this would absolve lower officials of guilt and
responsibility.' 0
Defendants who received illicit "orders were placed in a
difficult position, but compliance with clearly criminal" commands
based upon a speculative fear of disadvantage or possible punish-
ment did not constitute a defense." "The defense of coercion or
necessity in the face of danger required" that a reasonable person
"would apprehend that he was in such imminent physical peril as to
deprive him" of the ability to choose "right" from "wrong."442 An
officer also could not credibly contend that in light of his or her
character that subordinates should have realized that they were
expected to disregard an order."3  The Tribunal found it
"contemptible" that subordinates would be expected to display the
"courage to disobey the order which he himself in passing it down
showed that he lacked."' The rule that superior orders do not
constitute a defense should come as no surprise to individuals who
had been subject to German military code."5
The central contribution of the High Command decision was to
articulate the scope of legal liability of field commanders and staff
officers. A commander may legitimately assume that orders
routinely transmitted through the chain of command were in
conformity with international law.' 4 The defendants were soldiers
rather than lawyers and could not be expected to have drawn fine
distinctions in regards to the intricacies of armed combat."7 The
Tribunal determined "that to find a field commander criminally
responsible for the transmittal of an order, [the officer] must have
passed the order [through] the chain of command and the order
must [have been] criminal upon its face, or one which he is shown
to have known was criminal.""8  The orders conveyed by the
438. High Command Judgment, supra note 428.
439. Id.
440. Id at 508-09.
441. Id. at 509.
442. Id.
443. High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 520.
444. Id. at 520-21.
445. Id. at 509.
446. Id. at 510-11.
447. Id. at 511.
448. High Command Judgment, supra note 428.
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defendants in this case, according to "any standard of civilized
nation.., were contrary to the customs of war and accepted
standards of humanity. Any commanding officer of normal
intelligence must see and understand their criminal nature. ' ' 49
The Tribunal also held that a chief of staff might incur
liability.40 A chief of staff who translated a criminal concept into a
military order, either himself or through subordinates, or took
personal action to distribute the order to units which implemented
the criminal command, was criminally liable under international
law. 51 Staff officers typically did not possess general command
authority or responsibility for the conduct of troops in the field and
their only available avenue was to "call [misconduct]... to the
attention of the commanding officer.4 52  Still, staff officers
exercised discretion in the drafting and distribution of orders.53
They were "indispensable" to developing and disseminating many
of the Nazi's odious directives and "cannot escape criminal
responsibility.., on the plea that they were complying with the
orders of a superior who was more criminal."
454
Field Marshal Wilhelm von Leeb was Commander in Chief of
the Army Group North in the Russian campaign.4 5 He was present
during a meeting, in March 1941, at which Hitler announced the
order to exterminate commissars.456  Von Leeb reportedly
considered this to be violative of international law and conveyed his
457
misgivings to the Army High Command on numerous occasions.
Hitler, however, refused to rescind the order and circumvented
command resistance by routing the directive to subordinate army
groups.4
8
449. Id. at 512.
450. Id. at 513. The Hostage Judgment, supra note 378, acquitted staff officers
Hermann Fosrtech, id. at 1281-86, and Kurt von Geitner, id. at 1286-88. The High
Command Judgment, supra note 428, limited this analysis to the facts and declined
to interpret this as absolving staff officers from criminal culpability as a matter of
law. Id. at 513.
451. High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 512.
452. Id. at 514.
453. Id. at 515.
454. Id.
455. Id. at 553. "Criminal orders were executed by units subordinate to [von
Leeb] and criminal acts were carried out by agencies within his command." The
prosecution was required to demonstrate that von Leeb knew of and had "been
connected with such criminal acts, either [through] participation or criminal
acquiescence." High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 555.
456. Id. at 555.
457. Id. at 555-56.
45& Id. at 556.
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Von Leeb countered the command by expressing opposition to
subordinate military officials.4 19  The Tribunal sympathetically
noted that an effort to revoke the order would have constituted
"flagrant disobedience."' 0 Resignation would have been futile and
only would have neutralized von Leeb as a force of resistance."
Under these circumstances, tacit opposition seemed the correct
course of conduct.62 Although the order resulted in numerous
atrocities, the Tribunal exonerated von Leeb6' He did not
disseminate the order and protested and opposed the command in
"every way short of open and defiant refusal to disobey it."'' The
fact that his subordinate commanders disseminated and enforced
the directive is "their responsibility and not his., 465 Von Leeb,
however, was convicted of transmitting the Barbarossa Jurisdiction
order.4 6 The Tribunal determined that he placed the weight of his
authority behind the order and took no steps to prevent its
implementation.4 67 The command was criminally applied by von
Leeb's subordinate units and, having set the order in motion, he
must assume a measure of responsibility.
Field Marshal Georg Karl Friedrich-Wilhelm von Kuechler
was Commander of the 18th Army and, in 1942, succeeded von
Leeb as Commander of Army Group North 69 At the time that the
Commissar Order was implemented, in 1941, von Kuechler was in
charge of the 18th Army during the Russian campaign. 4" The
Tribunal observed that von Kuechler distributed the order and that
he must have been aware that it was being enforced by his
subordinates.4 1' This was a "criminal order upon its face" and the
fact that von Kuechler was emotionally divided or that disobe-
dience may have resulted in retribution, may be considered in
mitigation. The Tribunal queried whether it was "any wonder
459. Id. at 557.
460. High Command Judgment, supra note 428.
461. Id.
462. Id.
463. Id.
464. Id.
465. High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 558.
466. Id. at 560-61.
467. Id. at 560.
468. Id. at 560-61. Von Leeb was sentenced to fifteen years imprisonment. Id.
at 696.
469. Id. at 565.
470. High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 565-66.
471. Id. at 567.
472. Id.
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that persecutions followed when heads of armies were issuing such
inflammatory and inciting orders?
4 73
General Hermann Hoth was Commander of Panzer Group 3.474
He testified that he received the Commissar Order and passed it on,
confident that his subordinates would be aware that he opposed
enforcement of the command.4 75  The Tribunal noted that the
"unexpressed hope" that a criminal order will not be carried out is
neither a defense nor grounds for the mitigation of punishment. 76
Defendant Hans Reinhardt was Commanding General of the
XLI Panzer Corps.7 ' He orally communicated the Commissar
Order to his divisional commanders and claimed that he directed
that the command was not to be carried out.478 Reinhardt also
purportedly protested to his direct superior and his misgivings were
allegedly transmitted through the chain of command to the Chief of
the German Army.4 79 He nevertheless received reports that the
order was being effectively and efficiently implemented.4" The
Tribunal admonished that if international law is to prove effective
that high commanding officers "must have the courage to act, in
definite and unmistakable terms, so as to indicate their repudiation
of such an order." '81 The proper response to a request from the
military command "to report the number of commissars killed
would have been that this unit does not murder enemy prisoners of
war." The Court also dismissed the defense that the Commissar
Order inevitably would have become widely known and imple-
mented by troops at the front regardless of whether it had been
disseminated by the defendant. ' 3
Defendant Lieutenant General Hermann Reinecke was Chief
of the General Wehrmacht Office with authority over Prisoner of
War Affairs.' He drafted and prepared orders under the authority
473. Id. at 580. There was contradictory evidence as to whether von Kuechler
had lodged complaints. Id. at 566-67. Von Kuechler was sentenced to twenty
years in prison. High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 695.
474. Id.
475. Id. at 582.
476. Id.
477. Id. at 596.
478. High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 597.
479. Id.
480. Id.
481. Id. at 598.
482. Id. Reinhardt contended that he orally expressed opposition to the order
and that the reports that commissars were killed were fictitious and intended to
please military authorities. High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 597.
483. Id. at 598.
484. Id. at 650.
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of his superior, Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the High Commando of
the Armed Forces.4 The Tribunal noted that the defendant
formulated, drafted and prepared orders which were issued under
his signature and may not escape responsibility based on the claim
that the commands had been conveyed under Keitel's general
authority.
4 6
Brigadier General Walter Warlimont was Chief of National
Defense in the Army High Command." He was adjudged guilty of
crafting and consolidating the Commando Order and contributing
to the content of the command. 4 There was no evidence that he
ameliorated the harshness of the directive.4' This was only one of
the many orders which he helped to draft which "brought suffering
and death to countless honorable soldiers and unfortunate
civilians.4' Rudolf Lehmann was Chief of the Legal Department of
the High Command and was convicted of assisting in the drafting of
the Barbarossa Jurisdiction Order.491 Lehmann explained that in
drafting the order that he removed jurisdiction over civilian
offenses from military courts in anticipation that defendants would
be acquitted based on a lack of evidence and that this would
provoke Hitler to attack and to abolish the panels.49' The Tribunal
criticized Lehman's defense as amounting to the claim that "in
order to avoid criticism of military courts by [Hitler], he was ready
to sacrifice the lives of innocent people" by authorizing the military
to summarily execute enemy civilians charged with offenses against
the Reich.493
The central contribution of the High Command decision was to
define the scope of liability of commanders in the field and staff
officers. A commander was liable for transmitting an order which
was facially criminal or which he was aware contravened the code
of armed conflict. 494 The Tribunal appreciated that the defendant
officers were not legal technicians, but stressed that the orders
conveyed from the High Command would have been viewed as
clearly criminal by similarly situated individual of "normal
485. Id. at 651.
486. Id. at 653.
487. High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 662.
488. Id. at 665.
489. Id.
490. Id. at 683.
491. Id. at 691-93.
492. High Command Judgment, supra note 428, at 693.
493. Id.
494. See supra notes 446-48 and accompanying text.
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intelligence."'' " Staff officers incurred legal liability in those
instances in which they assisted in the formulation or shaping of
conspicuously criminal commands or were involved in transmitting
these directives through the chain of command."9  The Court
mitigated punishment in those instances in which a defendant's
disagreement was clearly communicated to both superiors and
subordinates and active efforts were undertaken to prevent the
implementation and enforcement of the command.4" Commanders
also could not credibly contend that their opposition was effectively
communicated through silence or subtlety.' 98
These three decisions under Control Council Law No. 10
significantly secured and clarified the international law of superior
orders. Obedience to orders was recognized as essential to the
military enterprise, but the Tribunals cautioned that international
law only required obedience to lawful orders.499 The principle that
superior orders were not a defense to criminal acts was deemed to
be a rule of fundamental justice that had been adopted by civilized
nations; orders may mitigate but may not justify the crime.'
German military law recognized the defense in those instances in
which a combatant was cognizant of the illegality of a command. 1
This subjective test was expanded in the Control Council Law No.
10 cases to encompass an objective standard which encompassed
commands which would be clearly criminal to an individual of the
defendant's military experience and status."° An individual thus
was criminally liable in those instances in which he obeyed an order
which he knew or reasonably should have known was contrary to
the humanitarian law of war. 3
The Nuremberg moral choice standard was interpreted to
mean that an officer carrying out superior orders could mitigate his
punishment in those instances in which he implemented a command
in order to avoid an imminent and overwhelming harm which was
disproportionate to the harm potentially resulting from carrying out
the order." Defendants in such instances were considered to lack
495. See supra note 449 and accompanying text.
496. See supra notes 450-54 and accompanying text.
497. See supra notes 458-65 and accompanying text.
498. See supra notes 475-76 and accompanying text.
499. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
500. See supra note 405 and accompanying text.
501. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text.
502. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
503. See supra notes 396-97 and accompanying text.
504. See supra notes 339-40 and accompanying text.
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the requisite criminal intent.05 An individual enlisting in a criminal
crusade could not later contend that he did not anticipate being
compelled to engage in illicit activity."
A defendant also might mitigate his punishment in those
instances in which he impeded the implementation of an order by
actively articulating opposition to superiors and subordinates,
resigned,5" limited the scope of a criminal order,5°9 issued directives
intended to align the command with the requirements of the
humanitarian law of war,"' or in which the requirements of
international law were ambiguous or uncertain." Punishment also
was mitigated in those instances in which a commanding officer was
not responsible for transmitting an order through the chain of
command. 12 An officer could not assume that subordinates would
automatically appreciate that he opposed and expected them to
resist an order.13
D. Other Prosecutions Before Control Council No. 10 and
Domestic Courts
The case notes to a decision by a United States military
commission sitting in Shanghai China, in 1946, observed that the
plea of superior orders was the most frequently raised defense in
post-World War II war crimes trial.5'4 A British military court later
observed in Wielen that recognition of the defense in the case
before it would result in only the now deceased Adolf Hitler being
held liable for the murder of fifty English officers. 15
A British military court, in Peleus, convicted a German
commander and various subordinates of attacking the survivors of a
military transport ship. 16 The Court dismissed the contention that
505. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
506. See supra notes 342 and accompanying text.
507. See supra note 457-65 and accompanying text.
508. See supra notes 357-61 and accompanying text.
509. See supra notes 421-22 and accompanying text.
510. See supra notes 417-19 and accompanying text.
511. See supra note 414 and accompanying text.
512. See supra notes 458-65 and accompanying text.
513. See supra notes 475-76 and accompanying text.
514. Trial of Lieutentant General Shigeru Sawada and Three Others (U.S.
Milit. Comm'n, Shanghai, Feb. 27-April 15, 1946) V L. REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 1,
13(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) (notes on the case) [hereinafter Sawada].
515. Trial of Max Wielen and 17 Others (The Stalag Luft III Case) (Brit. Milit.
Ct., Hamburg, Germany, July 1-Sept. 3, 1947) XI L. REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 31,
47 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947) (notes on the case) [hereinafter Wielen].
516. Trial of Kaitanleutenant Heinz Eck and Four Others (The Peleus Trial)
(Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg Germany Oct. 17-20, 1945) I L. REPT. TRIAL WAR
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it was inappropriately extending its jurisdiction into a matter of
German sovereignty and disregarding a strong tradition of
contemporary jurisprudence, which recognized that totalitarian
States were entitled to the undivided and devoted loyalty of citizens
and conscripts.517 The defense queried in response whether the
defendants could have been expected to disregard the directives of
the Nazi regime in light of the recognition accorded to the National
Socialist government by the United States and Great Britain.
5 18
The case notes to Wielen observed that when confronted with
the "insoluable dilemma" of whether to observe the dictates of
domestic or international law that the weight of legal opinion was
that transnational law must prevail.19 In Sawada, a United States
military court rejected the defense that the Japanese defendants
were obligated to obey the Enemy Airmen's Law which flagrantly
contravened international law by imposing a mandatory summary
death sentence on captured enemy pilots.2 In successfully calling
for the conviction of German defendants who followed orders to
beat and to execute a British pilot whose plane had crashed, the
prosecutor in Renoth noted that "there could be no doubt that
shooting at a pilot.., was an act which both violated the rules of
warfare and outraged the general feelings of humanity."52'
CRIM. 1 (1947) [hereinafter Peleus].
517. Id. at 8.
518. Id. at 9.
519. Wielen, supra note 515, at 50. The Judge Advocate in Rhode argued that it
was not unfair to impose liability on the defendants despite the fact that they had
been trained to obey orders. He noted that in the event that the judges were to
visit a field-marshal in a mental institution who proceeded to direct them to kill the
director that they were not likely to carry out the command. This, according to the
Judge Advocate, was emblematic of the question which had confronted the
defendants: "'whether if anyone gives an order, emanating even from the highest
authority, which obviously cannot be permitted, you are going to obey it or not."'
Trial of Werner Rhode and Eight Others (Brit. Milit. Ct., Wuppertal, Germany,
May 29-June 1, 1946) V L. REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 54, 58 (Notes On The Case)
(emphasis omitted) (trial of six defendants for following orders to execute four
British nurses).
520. Sawada, supra note 514, at 23 (Notes On The Case).
521. The Trial of Hans Renoth and Three Others (Brit. Milit. Ct., Elten,
Germany, Jan. 8-10, 1946) XI L. REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 76, 78 (1949) (Notes On
The Case). In convicting Haupsturmfuhrer Karl Buck for the execution of
fourteen prisoners of war, the Judge Advocate proposed a tripartite standard
which was widely-cited. Under this test an accused would be criminally culpable in
the event that he committed a war crime pursuant to an order which was obviously
unlawful; he knew was unlawful; or he ought to have known to be unlawful had he
considered the circumstances under which it was issued. Trial of Karl Buck and
Ten Others (Brit. Milit. Ct., Wuppertal, Germany, May 6-10, 1946) V L. REPT.
TRIAL WAR CRIM. 39, 43 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948) (Notes On the Case)
[hereinafter Buck]. The Judge Advocate observed that the maxim that ignorance
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In Jaluit Atoll, four Japanese defendants were convicted of
following orders to execute three United States airmen."' The
accused invoked the cultural plea that they were bound to obey the
orders of their superiors which were considered to emanate from
His Majesty the Emperor."' The Court refused to accept that the
law of superior orders should accommodate the fact that the liberal
notion of individual autonomy was inconsistent with Japan's
"'totalistic and absolutistic military society."'524 The Tribunal ruled
that an individual of ordinary sense and understanding would have
grasped the illegal nature of the execution order and sentenced to
death all those integrally involved in the killings.5
The punishment was mitigated of several defendants who
carried out superior orders and played a modest role in war crimes.
The three defendants who followed orders to execute United States
airmen in Jaluit Atoll were sentenced to death. 6  However,
defendant Tasaki, who was in charge of the prisoners and turned
them over for execution, was sentenced to ten years imprisonment
based on his "'brief, passive and mechanical"' role. 27
The sentences of the defendants in Sawada also were
mitigated." Eight United States airmen were shot down following
an attack against a Japanese steel mill, oil refinery and aircraft
of the law did not constitute an excuse did not fully pertain in the international law
of war. Although the defendants were not lawyers and may not be conversant with
the details of military jurisprudence, the Judge Advocate stressed that courts must
consider whether a defendant should have expected to know "as a matter of
general facts of military life" that his acts were violative of the rights of prisoners
of war." Id. at 44 (Notes On The Case). Dutch courts determined that the
Nuremberg standard was -limited to the prosecution of high-ranking German
officers and was not a general rule of international law. As a result, the judiciary
relied on domestic statutes and on the German law of superior orders. See Trial of
Willy Zuehlke (Netherlands Special Ct., Amsterdam, Aug. 3 1948 & Netherlands
Special Ct. of Cassation, Dec. 6, 1948) XIV L. REPr. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 139, 147-50
(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1949) (Notes On The Case).
522. Trial of Rear-Admiral Nisuke Masuda and Four Others of the Imperial
Japanese Navy (The Jaluit Atoll Case) (U.S. Milit. Comm'n, United States Naval
Air Base, Kwajalein Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshal Islands, Dec. 7-13, 1945) I L.
REPr. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 71 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947).
523. Id. at 74 (Notes On The Case).
524. Id.
525. Id. at 75-76.
526. Trial of Rear-Admiral Nisuke Masuda and Four Others of the Japanese
Navy (Jaluit Atoll Case) (U.S. Milt. Comm'n, United States Naval Air Base,
Kwajalein Island, Kwajalein Atoll, Marshall Islands, Dec. 7-13, 1945) I L. REPT.
TRIAL WAR CRIM. 71, 76 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947).
527. Id.
528. See Sawada, supra note 514, at 2.
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factory. 29 The Americans were imprisoned in solitary confinement
for fifty-two days and then convicted at a summary trial. 3° In
accordance with instructions from Tokyo, three of the Americans
were subsequently executed.53'
The defendants were found to have "exercised no initiative to
any marked degree. 532 High governmental and military officials
enacted and circulated the retroactive Enemy Airmen's Law under
which the defendants were prosecuted and punished and also issued
special instructions as to the treatment, trial, sentencing and
punishment of the airmen.533
The Court noted that General Shigeru Sawada was absent
during the proceedings, resisted and then acquiesced in the result.5"
He was found to have negligently rather than intentionally and
willfully brought about the death of the fliers 35 and was sentenced
to the relatively light sentence of five years at hard labor.536
Lieutenant Yusei Wako served on the three judge panel and,
despite his legal training, convicted the defendants based on false
and fraudulent confessions and evidence provided by the Military
Police in Tokyo.3 He obeyed the special instructions of his
superiors in voting the death penalty."' Lieutenant Yusie Okada,
lacked legal training, protested at being assigned as a judge, but
dutifully complied with orders in voting the death penalty.
39
Although these two defendants participated in a trial in which the
defendants were denied due process,' their sentences were
mitigated and they were punished to nine and five years in prison
respectively. ' There was no evidence that prison warden Sotojiro
Tatsuta personally mistreated or executed the prisoners" and he
was sentenced to five years at hard labor.' 3 The Court seemingly
529. Id.
530 See id. at 2-3.
531. Id. at 4.
532 Id. at 7.
533. See Sawada, supra note 514.
534. Id.
535. Id.
536. Id. at 8.
537. Id. at 7.
538. See Sawada, supra note 514.
539. Id.
540. Id. at 12 (Notes On The Case).
541. Id. at 8.
542. Id. at 7.
543. See Sawada, supra note 514, at 8.
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viewed the officials in Tokyo as primarily responsible for the
airmen's trial, conviction and execution.5"
In Bauer, Colonel Karl Bauer, in accordance with terms of the
the Commando Order, directed Ernst Schrameck to kill three
irregular French combatants."' Schrameck passed the order on to
Herbert Falten whose squad executed the prisoners. 46 Bauer was
sentenced to death while Schrameck and Falten were punished by
five years imprisonment."7  The Court presumably credited
Schrameck's defense that Bauer's orders were "'categorical"' and
did not admit for "'discussion."'" Falten initially resisted the
execution and approached Schrameck to determine whether he
desired to revoke the order.4 9
In Wagner, a French military tribunal determined that Ludwig
Luger, the Public Prosecutor at the Special Court at Strasbourg,
followed the instructions of Robert Wagner, Reich Governor of
Alsace, in successfully requesting the death penalty for thirteen
individuals apprehended while crossing the border into Switzer-
land." Luger conceded in his final statement that there was no
evidence that any of the accused were responsible for shooting a
frontier guard killed during the attempted escape.551 Luger was
convicted,552 but received no punishment based on the fact that he
followed superior orders on a matter which was properly within
Wagner's competence and responsibility.
553
The mitigation of punishment in Jaluit Atoll, Sawada, Bauer
and Wagner all were seemingly based on the fact that the lower-
level defendants mechanically carried out orders which provided
little opportunity for the exercise of discretion.54 The Courts
seemingly desired to shift primary responsibility to those who
544. Id. at 13 (Notes On The Case).
545. Trial of Carl Bauer, Ernst Schrameck and Herbert Falten (Perm. Milit.
Trib., Dijon, Oct. 18, 1945) VIII L. REr. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 15 (U.N. War Crimes
Comm'n, 1949) [hereinafter Bauer Judgment]. There was a dispute concerning
these troops' entitlement to be recognized as lawful combatants. See id. at 16-19.
546. Id.
547. Id. at 16.
548. Id. at 21.
549. Bauer Judgment, supra note 545.
550. Trial of Robert Wagner, Gauleiter and Six Others (Perm. Milit. Trib. at
Strasboug, 1946, and Ct. of Appeal, July 24, 1946), III L. REPr. TRIAL WAR CRIM.
23, 31 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948).
551. Id. at 32.
552. Id. at 42.
553. Id. at 54 (Notes On The Case).
554. See supra notes 527, 548, 550 and accompanying text.
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planned and implemented the policies.5 The sentences seemed to
overlook the often catastrophic consequences of the defendants'
criminal conduct which was undertaken in the cool and calm of the
moment rather than during the heat of armed combat.556
A number of lower-ranking defendants successfully invoked a
mistake-of-fact defense rather than rely on superior orders. They
claimed that in acting in accordance with superior orders in
executing prisoners, they relied in good faith on the judgment of
superiors who presumably were well-informed concerning the
requirement of international law.557 In Hans, the Norwegian
Supreme Court quashed the conviction of Haupsturmfuhrer Oscar
Hans.558 The accused complied with orders to execute Norwegians
sentenced to death by German courts in Norway.59 The Court, in
acquitting Hans of knowingly killing sixty-eight prisoners without
trial, noted that the accused received the execution orders from his
superior which "created or helped to create a mistake of fact in the
accused's mind" as to the legality of the executions 6° A post-war
West German Court acquitted a member of the criminal police of
executing a Polish prisoner of war who allegedly attacked a police
sergeant.16' The Federal Supreme Court concluded that the accused
possessed no reason to "distrust" the legality under international
law of an execution order emanating from the Gestapo which had
been vested with the administration of justice over Poles within the
Reich.5 62 A British military tribunal, however, rejected the mistake-
of-fact defense in Buck.63 The Court noted that the defendants'
claim that they believed that the fourteen prisoners of war they
executed had been lawfully sentenced was belied by the facts that
the killings took place in isolated woods, an effort was made to
obliterate all traces of the killings, and the bodies were stripped of
555. See supra notes 537-41, 547, 553 and accompanying text.
556. See supra note 546 and accompanying text.
557. See Trial of Karl Adman Golkel and Thirteen Others (Brit. Milit. Ct.,
Wuppertal, Germany, 1946) V L. REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 45, 49 (U.N. War
Crimes Comm'n, 1948) (Notes On The Case) (the defendants were not directly
involved in the executions).
558. Trial of Haupsturmfuhrer Oscar Hans (Eidsivating Lagmannsrett, Jan
1947 and Sup. Ct. Norway, Aug. 1947) V L. REPT. TRIALS WAR CRIM. 82 (U.N.
War Crimes Comm'n, 1948).
559. Id. at 84-85.
560. Id. at 93 (Notes On The Case).
561. Execution of Prisoner of War Case (Fed. Sup. Ct., German Fed. Rep.,
Dec. 12, 1950), 19 I.L.R. 532.
562. Id. at 535.
563. See Buck, supra note 521, at 43 (Notes On The Case).
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identification and buried in a bomb crater."' The mistake-of-fact
defense had the advantage of permitting courts to acquit, rather
than to merely mitigate, the sentences of defendants who dutifully
carried out circumscribed commands.
Courts lacked sympathy for defendants who exercised some
degree of discretion and did not merely dutifully fulfill the dictates
of authority. For instance, defendants who exceeded the scope of
their superior orders could not shelter themselves behind the
defense. 66 General Anton Dostler was convicted of ordering the
summary executions of two American officers and thirteen enlisted
men captured in Italy167 Dostler pled that Hitler's order character-
ized the killing of commandos captured in combat as justified acts
of reprisal which were required to deter the illegal methods of
warfare employed by the Allies 68 The Tribunal noted that the
Americans were executed two days following their apprehension
and that Hitler's order required that combatants who were not
killed upon capture were to be handed over to the security
services.169 Dostler, in directing his own troops to carry out the
executions, failed to follow the terms of the order and could not
camouflage his acts by invoking the Fuhrer's command.7 °
Police chief Albert Bury ordered his subordinate, Wilhem
Hafner, to immediately execute a captured American pilot.
71
Although Bury's order was in accord with German policy, a United
States military court determined that he possessed discretion in
determining whether a specific flyer should be killed and that there
was no necessity to expeditiously execute the pilot.' Both were
sentenced to death.573  In Moehle, the accused was a Korvetten
Kapitan in the German Navy and, from September, 1942 to May,
1945, commanded the 5th U-boat Flotilla at Kiel.574  He was
convicted of verbally conveying a standing order to U-boat
564. Id.
565. Id. at 564-71.
566. See Trial of General Anton Dostler, Commander of the 75th German
Army Corps (U.S. Milit. Comm'n, Rome, 1945) 1 L. REPr. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 22
(U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1947) [hereinafter Dostler].
567. Id. at 22-23.
568. Id. at 33 (Notes On The Case).
569. Id.
570. Id.
571. Albert Bury and Wilhelm Hafner (U.S. Milit. Comm'n, Freising, Germany,
1945), III L. REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 62,63 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948).
572 Id. at 64 (Notes On The Case).
573. Id. at 62.
574. Trial of Karl-Heinz Moehle (Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg, Germany, 1946),
IX L. REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 75 (1949).
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commanders in a fashion that strongly suggested that German
policy was to kill the survivors of sunken ships rather than merely
to avoid rescue in those instances in which a U-boat would be
placed at risk."'
A defendant could not plead a superior order as a defense
which he knew or should have known had been rescinded. First
Lieutenant Gerhard Grumpelt received an order issued in anticipa-
tion of the cessation of hostilities and surrender to scuttled U-
boats. 76 The command was immediately rescinded, but Grumpelt
nevertheless proceeded to scuttle two submarines." He contended
that the countermanding order had not been issued by an officer
with the requisite authority and that he had been unaware that the
other U-boat commanders had pledged to respect the armistice and
not to scuttle their ships."' He further explained that the original
order was consistent with his training that he possessed a duty to
prevent vessels from falling into enemy hands.579 The Court
determined that the Grumpelt was aware that the order to scuttle
the submarines had been retracted '8o and sentenced him to seven
years in prison."'
The defense of duress also generally was dismissed.5 8 General
Nickolaus von Falkenhorst, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
forces in Norway, in 1942, passed on the Commando Order to his
subordinates." In June, 1943, von Falkenhorst republished and
amended the order to provide for the execution within twenty-four
hours of detainees subjected to interrogation.'
The notes to the case observed that the last paragraph of the
Fuhrer Order threatened to court martial officers who failed to
carry out the command. 85 This certainly was to be taken seriously
575. Id.at 75-78.
576. Trial of Oberleutenant Gerhard Grumpelt (The Scuttled U-boats Case)
(Brit. Milit. Ct., Hamburg, Germany, .1946), I L. RErr. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 55, 56
(1947).
577. Id. at 56.
57& Id. at 60.
579. Id.
580. Id. at 69-70 (Notes On The Case).
581. Id. at 65.
582. See Trial of Otto Sandrock and Three Others (The Alemlo Trial) (Brit.
Milit. Ct., Almelo, Holland, 1945) 1 L. REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 35, 37 (1947).
583. Trial of General oberst Nickolaus Von Falkenhorst (Brit. Milit. Ct.,
Brunswick, 1946), XI L. REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 18, 22 (1949) [hereinafter
Falkenhorst Judgment].
584. Id.
585. Id. at 24 (Notes On The Case).
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given the Fuhrer's legal authority and physical power.586 Neverthe-
less, the notes observed that the accused had not confronted the
immediate infliction of death or grievous bodily harm.87
Falkenhorst's situation was remote from the dilemma which was
faced by an inmate of a concentration camp forced at gun point to
commit an atrocity against another prisoner9 In Leopold L., the
Austrian Supreme Court clarified that duress required physical or
psychic coercion, "the overcoming of which would require unusual
powers of resistance or exceptional heroism, and which therefore
overcomes the contrary will of the person under coercion, in view
of 'considerable danger' threatening life, freedom or property."'589
The Court affirmed the defendant's conviction, noting that he had
not alleged that he confronted a conflict of conscience which caused
him to resist carrying out the clearly illegal order to kill Jewish and
Polish prisoners.
There was continuing controversy over whether individuals
who defied orders, in fact, risked retribution. In Dostler, a high-
ranking officer in the Wehrmacht, General von Saenger, testified
on behalf of the accused that he knew of one case of retribution and
a second which was rumored to have occurred. 9' However, he
alleged that he was not aware of an instance in which an individual
had been executed for failure to carry out the Commando Order.5"
Von Saenger also testified that officers pledged loyalty to the
Fuhrer, Adolf Hitler, and believed that they were obligated to obey
all orders and to fulfill their military obligation.9  In those
instances in which Hitler's orders appeared to contravene inter-
national law, von Saenger conceded that it was commonly believed
that Hitler arranged with enemy governments to immunize German
combatants from legal liability.5 94 In Bruns, the three accused were
variously charged with the murder and torture of Norwegian
prisoners.9  The latter involved cold baths, kicks, blows and leg
586. Id. at 24-25.
587. Id. at 25.
588. Id.
589. Public Prosecutor v. Leopold L. (Austria, Sup. Ct., 1967), 47 I.L.R. 464,
471.
590. Id. at 469.
591. Dostler, supra note 566, at 27.
592. Id.
593. Id. at 28.
594. Id. at 27-28.
595. Trial of Kriminalsekretar Richard Wilhelm Hermann Bruns and Two
Others (Eidsivating Lagmannsrett and the Supreme Court of Norway, 1946), III L.
REPT. TRIAL WAR CRIM. 15 (U.N. War Crimes Comm'n, 1948)
[Vol. 20:1
THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE
screws. 56  The defendants claimed that they would have been
subject to retribution had they refused to carry out acts of torture. 97
The Norwegian lower court, however, refused to accept that even
the Nazi regime could force defendants to involuntarily engage in
such "brutal and atrocious acts.,
598
A Dutch Court seemingly recognized the doctrine of military
necessity in acquitting two members of the Dutch resistance of
executing four prisoners.5" The resistance was fighting alongside
French parachute troops and was surronded and under siege by
German troops.' Fearful that the detainees would impede their
defense, the Dutch and French commander conferred and ordered
Van E. to execute the prisoners.6 °" The Court determined that Van
E. was entitled to assume in good faith that he was obligated to
carry out this command which had been issued under conditions of
extreme stress and danger.602
In Falkenhorst, the case notes indicate that that superior orders
"becomes a more complicated matter" when joined with reprisals. 3
The text noted that "there is no more difficult subject in the ambit
of the law relating to war crimes" than determining whether a
defendant who carried out an otherwise illegal order should be
exonerated based on the fact that the defendant believed that the
crimes constituted a lawful act of reprisal.6°' Von Falkenhorst
claimed that he was entitled to assume that the proper legal
considerations had been weighed and balanced by his superiors in
the Nazi regime prior to characterizing the Commando Order as a
lawful reprisal.6 5 The Court noted that while a senior soldier such
as Falkenhorst would be expected to know the rules of warfare and
humanity after twenty years of service that he would not necessarily
be well-versed in the factual foundation of the claim of reprisal.6°6
596. Id. at 16-17.
597. Id. at 18.
598. Id. The Supreme Court was in possession of two documents indicating
that defendants engaging in torture would have been punished by German
authorities. Id. at 19-20.
599. Military Prosecutor v. B. and Van E. (Court Martial, Holland, 1951), 18
I.L.R. 536.
600. Id.
601. Id.
602. Id. at 536-37. B., the Dutch commander, was determined to have been
under a genuine misapprehension concerning the lawfulness of his actions. Id. at
537.
603. See Falkenhorst Judgment, supra note 583, at 25 (Notes On The Case).
604. Id. at 27 (Notes On The Case).
605. Id. at 26.
606. Id.
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The notes to the case, however, indicated that there were no facts
suggesting that the accused actually believed that the order was in
reprisal for the acts of the Allies.'
The Federal Supreme Court of Germany in the Preventive
Murder Case affirmed the accused's conviction for following orders
to execute foreign nationals employed as forced laborers.6 The
defendant unsuccessfully relied on the defense of tu quoque.609 The
Court, however, failed to find a sufficiently close connection
between Allied air attacks or acts of violence by Soviet troops in
the German eastern territories and the execution of defenseless
foreign workers.61' The Supreme Court ruled that the accused could
not reasonably believe that the defense of tu quoque applied.6 1
The Control Council Law cases shifted the focus to lower-level
combatants and illustrated the variety of factual circumstances in
which the superior orders defense was invoked. 612  The Courts
adopted both a subjective and objective standard in imputing
knowledge of an order's illegal character.613 This standard did not
vary in accordance with the cultural context of the alleged criminal
conduct. 614  These domestic tribunals demonstrated sympathy for
lower-level combatants, mitigating the punishment of individuals
who carried out narrowly-cast and configured commands.615 The
courts seemingly overlooked the fact that these defendants knew or
should have known that their often calamitous conduct was
violative of international law.6 6  In other instances, courts
recognized a mistake of fact defense in acquitting lower-ranking
defendants who were determined to have acted in good faith in
implementing facially legal orders. 61 ' The latter cases suggested that
lower-level combatants directed to carry out narrowly-tailored
607. Id. at 26-27.
608. War Crimes (Preventive Murder) (Germany) Case (Fed. Rep. Germany,
Fed. Sup. Ct., 1960), 32 I.L.R. 563.
609. Id. at 564. This doctrine provides that "no State may accuse another State
of violations of international law and exercise criminal jurisdiction over the latter's
citizens in respect of such violations if it is itself guilty of similar violations against
the other State or its allies. The right and duty of a State to hold its own citizens
responsible, in accordance with its municipal criminal law, for violations of
international law is not affected by this rule." Id.
610. Id. at 564-65. The rationale was to eliminate any threat that these workers
may pose in the future and to improve food supplies. Id. at 565.
611. Id. at 565.
61Z See supra notes 522-25 and accompanying text.
613. See supra note 521 and accompanying text.
614. See supra notes 522-25 and accompanying text.
615. See supra notes 526-53 and accompanying text.
616. See supra notes 534-43 and accompanying text.
617. See supra notes 557-65 and accompanying text.
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orders were not required to examine the factual foundation of the
commands.61 The superior orders defense was not recognized in
those instances in an accused exercised a degree of discretion or
augmented the details of orders. 19 Defendants also were unable to
establish the requisite degree of coercion to establish the defense of
duress,60 despite claims that resistance would have resulted in
retribution.62' Courts continued to be bedeviled by claims that a
defendant reasonably believed that an otherwise illegal order was a
lawful reprisal.622 The plea of tu quoque was potentially troubling in
that it might lead to acquittal for criminal acts which also were
engaged in by enemy belligerents.623
IV. Vietnam
A. My Lai
The contemporary United States standard for superior orders
under military law was set forth in United States v. Kinder.624
Kinder, an Air Force police officer, "apprehended a Korean
[national] in a bomb dump."625 Kinder turned the intruder over to
the Sergeant of the Guard, Robert Toth, who pistol whipped and
bloodied the detainee.626 In an apparent effort to conceal the
beating, Kinder later was ordered and complied with the command
of Air Police Officer George C. Schreiber to transport the prisoner
back to the bomb dump and kill him627 Schreiber explained that this
would serve to deter other intruders. 628  Kinder also followed
instructions to file a false report that the prisoner had been shot
while resisting arrest.
629
The Court Martial ruled that the content and context of the
order to execute the Korean detainee was "so obviously beyond the
scope of authority" of Kinder's superior and "so palpably illegal on
its face as to admit of no doubt of its unlawfulness to a man of
61& See supra notes 537-65 and accompanying text.
619. See supra notes 566-75 and accompanying text.
620. See supra notes 582-90 and accompanying text.
621. See supra notes 591-94 and accompanying text.
622. See supra notes 603-07 and accompanying text.
623. See supra notes 608-11 and accompanying text.
624. United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. 742 (1953).
625. Id. at 753.
626. Id.
627. Id at 755.
628. Id. at 759.
629. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. at 757.
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ordinary sense and understanding." 630  The Board of Review
stressed that in imputing knowledge to the accused that it
considered his twenty-year old age, eleventh grade education and
relatively brief two years experience in the United States military.63
The Board noted that Kinder's criminal intent was substantiated by
the fact that he resorted to a subterfuge to conceal and to justify the
killing.632
The defense contention that Kinder mistakenly believed that
he was obligated to obey every order was dismissed as "unreason-
able," "absurd" and "unbelievable., 63 3 The Board queried whether
the accused would feel a duty to obey an order to commit rape, to
steal or cut off his own head?6 4 The defendant also could not
convincingly claim that he mechanically carried out superior
commands and therefore lacked criminal intent. 635 Subordinate
soldiers were deemed to be reasoning agents who were under a
duty to exercise judgment and to avoid compliance with orders that
would be "palpably illegal on their face" to an individual of
ordinary sense and understanding.636  The Board of Review
approved the discretionary decision of the military command to
reduce the court martial's sentence from life to two years.637
In 1973 Lieutenant William Calley "was convicted by a general
court martial.., of premeditated murder and.., assault with intent
to commit murder., 638 Calley's platoon was assigned to participate
in a March 16, 1968, assault against the elite 48th Viet Cong
Battalion.639 His troops swept through the hamlet of My Lai (4) and
then joined other units in encircling the Viet Cong.6  An invest-
igation later revealed that while in My Lai, Calley supervised and
participated in the execution of Vietnamese civilians"' and also shot
and killed an elderly Vietnamese monk62 and a young child.63
630. Id. at 774.
631. Id; see also, id. at 761.
632. Id.
633. Id. at 775.
634. Kinder, 14 C.M.R. at 775.
635. Id.
636. Id. at 776.
637. Id. at 786.
638. United States v. Calley, 46 C.M.R. 1131, 1138 (A.C.M.R. 1973), affd 22
C.M.A. 534, 48 C.M.R. 19 (A.C.M.R. 1973), rev'd sub nom. Calley v. Callaway, 382
F. Supp. 650 (M.D. Ga. 1974), verdict reinstated, 519 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1975) cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).
639. See Calley, 46 C.M.R. at 1164.
640. Id. at 1167.
641. Id. at 169-72.
642. Id. at 1173.
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Calley's principle defense was that he acted in accordance with
superior orders and lacked a criminal intent.644 He contended that
on five separate occasions that Captain Ernest Medina ordered him
to "'waste"' the villagers.45 Medina, according to Calley, clearly
commanded "'that under no circumstances would we let anyone get
behind us, nor would we leave anything standing in these
villages.'"6"6
The Court of Military Review determined that had the jury
determined that an order had not been issued that this would have
had "abundant support in the record." 67 On the other hand, the
court martial also would have been justified in determining that a
claim of superior orders was inapplicable based on the fact that this
was an order which an individual of ordinary sense and under-
standing would know to be unlawful or was actually known by the
accused to be unlawful.6"8 The Court of Military Review dismissed
the defendant's argument that a subordinate should only be held
liable in the event that he personally knew of an order's illegality."9
The interests of the accused certainly should be considered, but that
this must be balanced against the fact that a subjective standard
643. Id. at 1173.
644. See Calley, 46 C.M.R. at 1180. The court-martial returned a general
verdict and the Court of Military Review was unable to determine whether the
Court found that no such orders had been given or, alternatively, determined that
orders were issued that were clearly contrary to the law of war. Id.
645. Id. at 1181. These orders were issued in the company and platoon leaders'
briefings the night before the engagement, in the morning prior to the helicopter
lift-off and twice while in the village through radio transmissions. Id. Three
defense witnesses confirmed that Medina instructed that women and children were
to be treated as the enemy. Roughly twenty prosecution and defense witnesses
had no recollection of a directive to kill women and children. Id. at 1182.
646. Calley, 46 C.M.R. at 1182. Captain Medina testified that he admonished C
Company that they would be out-numbered two to one and that the incursion into
the village would be preceded by artillery fire in order combat enemy forces.
Medina also informed the troops that civilians would be absent at the market. In
answer to a question, Median stated that women and children were not to be killed
unless they possessed a weapon and threatened American troops. He later added
that the village was to be destroyed by burning the hootches, killing the livestock,
closing the wells and destroying food crops. Medina conceded that prior to the lift-
off that he instructed Calley to lead prisoners through the mine fields. Medina
denied knowledge that women and children had been detained by American
troops in My Lai and claimed that he had not ordered the killing of civilians.
Medina's radio operators had no recollection that such orders had been issued. Id.
at 1181-82.
647. Id. at 1182.
648. Id. at 1183.
649. Id. at 1184.
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would risk subverting the constraints which curtail barbarism in
warfare.650
The Court of Military Appeals affirmed that the "man of
ordinary sense and understanding" under the circumstances test for
superior orders issued by the presiding judge was in conformity
with the prevailing legal standard.65' Calley had claimed that this
test was too strict and that it would be more equitable and fair to
determine "whether the order was so palpably or manifestly illegal
that a person of 'the commonest understanding' would be cognizant
of its illegality., 652 This was intended to provide a more generous
standard for imputing knowledge of a command's criminal
character.6 The Court of Appeals, however, determined that
"[w]hether Lieutenant Calley was the most ignorant person in the
United States Army in Vietnam, or the most intelligent, he must be
presumed to know that he could not kill the people involved her."
6
'"
Judge William H. Darden, in his dissent, argued that the
majority standard was too strict.65  This permitted the punishment
of individuals whose attitude, aptitude or training ill-equipped them
to make reasoned judgments or to comfortably challenge author-
itative commands.656 Judge Darden contended that adherence to
superior orders was an essential ingredient of discipline and should
constitute a defense unless the commands would be recognized as
illegal by persons of minimal intelligence and experience.657 A
combatant ought not to be subject to punishment based on a
retrospective determination that the evidence supported a finding
of "simple negligence on his part."658 In contrast, a test calibrated
on the commonest understanding would impute knowledge to an
accused based on the circumstantial concept that "almost anyone in
the armed forces would have immediately recognized that the order
was palpably illegal."
659
650. Calley, 46 C.M.R. at 1184.
651. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 27-29.
652. Id. at 27.
653. Id.
654. Id. at 29. The Court of Military Review observed that "Calley's judgment,
perceptions and stability were lesser in quality than the average lieutenant's and
these deficiencies are mitigating to some extent. However, the deficiencies did not
even approach the point of depriving him of the power of choice." Calley, 46
C.M.R. at 1196.
655. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 31.
656. Id. at 31.
657. Id.
658. Id.
659. Id. at 32
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Judge Darden recognized that humanitarian considerations
must be calibrated in formulating the superior orders defense, but
argued that the primary emphasis should be on insuring fairness to
the unsophisticated and least intelligent combatant.' A relaxed
standard based on "palpable illegality to the commonest under-
standing" also had the advantage of enhancing discipline by
protecting combatants who through training and attitude were
inclined to adhere to superior orders.66'
Darden concluded that it was not at all certain that Calley
would be convicted under this more generous standard 2 Medina
allegedly instructed by Calley to kill the villagers and to move
expeditiously through the hamlet in order to engage the main force
of the 48th Battalion.63 Calley also had been informed that the
individuals in the villages were either members of enemy forces or
enemy sympathizers and reasonably feared that villagers who were
left behind would pose a threat.' Thus, "the circumstances that
could have obtained there may have caused the illegality of alleged
orders to kill civilians to be much less clear than they are in a
hindsight review."'
The Pentagon Peers Report concluded that although Medina
may not have ordered the extermination of civilians that he roused
the troops to exact revenge for the company's casualties.' This
was compounded by the fact that Calley was ill-equipped to assume
a leadership position66' and his troops were thrust into combat
without adequate training.66 Calley easily could have concluded
that his actions in My Lai were fully consistent with American
strategies in Vietnam such as free fire zones, carpet bombings and
selective assassination.669 Analysts also have argued that his crimes
were a predictable psychological response to the pressures placed
on his platoon.6 7° In the end, only Calley stood convicted for the
660. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 32. The Court should apply this standard in light the
defendant's age, grade, intelligence, experience and training. Id.
661. Id.
662. Id. at 33.
663. Id. at 33.
664. Calley, 48 C.M.R. at 33.
665. Id.
666. UNITED STATES ARMY, I REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
REVIEW OF THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE MY LAI INCIDENT 8-14
(1970) [hereinafter Peers Report]; see also 8-4-8-5.
667. Id. at 8-8.
66& Id. at 8-13.
669. See Matthew Lippman, War Crimes: The My Lai Massacre and the Vietnam
War, 2 SAN DIEGO JUST. J. 295, 357-59 (1993).
670. See id. at 344-46.
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events at My Lai and ultimately was paroled after serving one-third
of his sentence.67'
B. Other Prosecutions
In United States v. Griffen, Sergeant Walter Griffen overhead a
radio conversation in which his platoon leader was informed by the
company commander that an enemy prisoner apprehended by
Griffen's platoon should be shot.67' Griffen was ordered to carry
out the killing which he believed was designed to safeguard the
platoon.673 The Americans had been detected by the enemy, and
several months earlier members of the platoon had been killed and
wounded in the same general area following the observation of
their position.674
The Army Board of Review affirmed that the court martial
properly refused to issue a jury instruction on the superior orders
defense since the command was "obviously beyond the scope of
authority of the superior officer and so palpably illegal on its face as
to admit of no doubt of its unlawfulness to a man of ordinary sense
and understanding., 67 The Board of Review, however, reduced
Griffen's sentence from ten to seven years, according mitigating
weight to the fact that the accused acted in a rapidly moving
sequence of events "without reflection and in honest obedience of a
superior's orders., 676  The mitigation of Griffen's sentence
undoubtedly was influenced by the fact that the order had been
issued by the company commander as well as by Griffen's relatively
low rank and eight years of meritorious service in the military.677
These facts resemble those in United States v. Kennan.678
Private Charles Keenan was sentenced to five years by the Army
Board of Review as a result of his compliance with orders to shoot
two Vietnamese civilians.679 Squad leader, Corporal Stanley J.
671. See id. at 317-19. See generally Koster v. United States, 685 F.2d 407 (Ct.
Cl. 1982).
672. United States v. Griffen, 39 C.M.R. 586, 587-88 (A.B.R. 1967).
673. Id. at 588. Griffen also assumed that the order was legal since his former
platoon leader had been relieved when a prisoner loosened his teather and
escaped. Id.
674. Id.
675. Id. at 590.
676. Id. at 591. The accused also testified against another soldier involved in
the incident and was adjudged to be remorseful and to possess a desire to be
rehabilitated. Id.
677. Id. at 726-33.
678. United States v. Keenan, 39 C.M.R. 108 (1969).
679. Id. at 110.
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Luczko fired three shots at close range at a Vietnamese female
apprehended by his troops.6 Keenan was ordered to "'finish her
off." '68' The accused testified that he believed that the woman
already was dead,682 a claim which later was supported by the Army
Board of Review.63 Keenan then watched as Luczko burned the
body. 68 Luczko and the squad later re-encountered an unarmed
male on a trail adjacent to the camp. The defendant's identification
papers were once again determined to be in order and there was no
evidence that he was acting in a suspicious fashion.65 The man
allegedly started to walk away and Luczko fired and turned to
Keenan and hollered "'[f]ire damn it, fire."' Keenan testified that
he shot because he was "'trained to obey"' orders "'without asking
any questions." ' 67 The Court of Military Appeals determined that
there was "manifestly no reason to fire at him [the man on the trail]
with an automatic weapon from a distance of about two feet.""8'
The Court concluded that "a homicide committed in obedience to a
lawful order is justified, but one in execution of a patently illegal
order is not." '68
Schultz was a third case in which the superior orders defense
was rejected.69° Lance Corporal Frank C. Schultz headed a four-
man patrol ordered to ambush and kill Viet Cong.69' Schulz
observed an illuminated house which he believed to be occupied by
the Viet Cong.692 He entered the dwelling, removed a male
occupant, and shot the detainee in the head.693 Witnesses testified
that the victim was a farmer who was not associated with the Viet
Cong.694 The Court of Military Appeals accused the superior orders
defense, holding that the issuance or execution of an order to kill
under the circumstances of this case is "unjustifiable under the laws
680. Id. at 112.
681. Id.
682. Id.
683. Keenan, 39 C.M.R. at 110.
684. Id. at 112.
685. Id. at 114.
686. Id.
687. Id.
688. Keenan, 39 C.M.R. at 117.
689. Id. at 118. Corpral Luczko was acquitted of complicity in connection with
the death of the male victim. There apparently was no evidence that Luczko's
shots inflicted a fatal injury. Id. at 119.
690. United States v. Schultz, 39 C.M.R 133 (1969).
691. Id. at 135.
692. Id.
693. Id.
694. Id.
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of this nation, the principles of international law, or the laws of land
warfare. Such an order would have been beyond the scope of
authority for a superior to give and would have been palpably
unlawful." 695
Finally, in United States v. Schwarz, Marine Private Michael
Schwarz was operating in a five man roving ambush patrol charged
with searching out and destroying enemy forces. 696 The patrol was
instructed by a lieutenant to "shoot first and ask questions later"
and were admonished that "'I want you to pay these little bastards
back"' for the marines who had been killed in the last week.697
The squad surrounded a hootch and seized two women and
two young children. One of the women ran and was felled with a
shot from Private Herrod, who was in charge of the mission. 9
Schwarz was ordered to "'go over and finish... [her] off.
'
'
61
Herrod then proclaimed that he had been ordered by the company
commander to kill detainees and ordered the squad to open fire."°
Schwarz was acquitted of the killings at the hootch based on a lack
of evidence."
The squad then encountered a twenty-year-old woman and five
young children and was ordered to open fire. Private Schwarz
joined the shooting, but his rifle jammed." The squad then entered
a third hootch and encountered two Vietnamese women and four
children.7"3 Herrod again ordered the squad to open fire and
Private Schwarz testified that he only shot his pistol after spotting
muzzle flashes from enemy weapons in the trees to the rear of the
detainees. ' The Court of Military Review determined that the
court-martial "necessarily found as a matter of fact that the accused
could not have honestly and reasonably believed that Herrod's
order to kill the apparently unarmed women and children was
695. Schultz, 39 C.M.R. at 136. The accused was sentenced to twenty-five years
in prison. Id. at 135.
696. United States v. Schwarz, 45 C.M.R. 852, 856 (1971).
697. Id. at 857. A Sergeant later cautioned Private Herrod, who was in charge
of the admission, "'not to go out there and just kill anything that moved, just go
out and do [his] job and get some."' Id.
69& Id.
699. Id.
700. Id. at 858.
701. Schwarz, 45 C.M.R. at 852.
702- Id.
703. Id.
704. Id.
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legal."70 5 His life sentence was commuted to one year in prison by
military authorities.7°6
These four prosecutions all involved the killing of civilians by
low-level combatants.7 7 In each instance, civilians who posed no
clear threat were killed during military operations conducted within
hostile territory.7°8 Judicial authorities appear to have recognized
the difficulty of resisting orders in such situations and, as a result,
generally meted out relatively light sentences.7' The modest
punishment imposed on these defendants undoubtedly reflected the
reluctance of American military courts to sanction long-serving and
loyal subordinate soldiers.71
The superior orders defense was unsuccessfully invoked by
individuals who objected to service in Vietnam. In Switkes v. Laird,
in 1970, the United States District Court rejected the claim of a
psychiatrist that an order requiring him to serve in Vietnam was
illegal because American actions in Indochina were being
conducted in violation of United States and international law.'
These illegal strategies and tactics included the indiscriminate
killing of noncombatants, the utilization of chemical warfare,
saturation bombing and the destruction of food and medicine.
Switkes contended that in the event that he was sent Vietnam that
he would be an accomplice to these war crimes."3 The Court
avoided this claim, ruling that Switkes' involvement in illicit actions
was "so unlikely as to require rejection" while significantly noting
that "[i]f he were a combat soldier or combat officer, the matter
would stand differently., 7
14
Three years later, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed
the conviction of Captain Howard Levy for disobedience of a direct
order to establish and operate a dermatological training program
705. Id. at 860. The appellate court also ruled that the court-martial was
properly instructed that the accused must be acquitted unless they determined
beyond a reasonable doubt that he did not honestly believe that he was being
engaged by the enemy. Schwarz, 45 C.M.R. at 862.
706. Id. at 854.
707. See supra notes 672, 679, 691 and accompanying text.
70& See supra notes 672-73, 685, 694-95 and accompanying text.
709. See supra notes 676-77, 687-89, 704-06 and accompanying text. On war
crimes and crimes against humanity in Vietnam, see generally Matthew Lippman,
Vietnam: A Twenty Year Retrospective, 11 DICK. J. INT'L L. 325 (1993).
710. See supra 677 and accompanying text.
711. Switkes v. Laird, 316 F. Supp 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
712. Id. at 364-65.
713. Id. at 365.
714. Id.
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for Special Forces Personnel in Vietnam.715 Levy contended that
these troops were committing war crimes and that his obedience to
this order would violate medical ethics, the Hippocratic oath, and
would constitute participation in criminal conduct.76 The Third
Circuit Court of Appeal dismissed Levy's claim, ruling that he
failed to demonstrate that the medical training which he was
717ordered to provide was related to the perpetration of war crimes.
There was no evidence that the Special Forces medical men as a
"group engaged systematically in the commission of war crimes by
prostituting their medical training., 718  The Court also held that
Levy failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the sole
purpose of issuing him an order to report for service in Vietnam
was to punish him for his publicly articulated opposition to the
conflict.719
V. Other Domestic Prosecutions
A. Israel and Germany
Other domestic military courts also have exhibited leniency
towards combatants. In Malinki, an Israeli Military Court of
Appeal, affirmed, in part, a district military court's conviction of
eight policemen charged with killing forty-three Arab residents of
Israel.7 '0 These killings arose out of nine incidents during a curfew
imposed on the village of Kafr Qassem. TM
Major Shmuel Malinki was ordered by the brigade
commander, Colonel Issachar Shadmi, to shoot individuals violat-
ing the curfew order imposed on eight Arab villages, even those
722returning to the villages who were unaware of the restriction.
Shadmi purportedly admonished Malinki that "'I don't want
sentimentality and I don't want any arrests, there will be no
715. Levy v. Parker, 478 F.2d 772, 797 (3d Cir. 1973), affd sub nom. Parker v.
Levy, 471 U.S. 733 (1973).
716. Id. at 797.
717. Id. The court conceded that war crimes had been committed by isolated
members of the Special Forces. Id.
718. Id.
719. Parker, 478 F.2d at 797. There were few prosecutions for violation of
orders and regulations in an effort to conceal the commission of war crimes. But
see United States v. Goldman, 43 C.M.R. 711 (1970).
720. Chief Military Prosecutor v. Malinki (Military Court of Appeal, 1959), II
PALESTINE Y.B. INT'L L. 69, 77 (1985) [hereinafter Malinki].
721. Id. at 78.
722. Id. at 88.
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arrests.""'7 Malinki immediately conveyed Shadmi's instructions to
his six company commanders and replied in response to a question
that the curfew applied equally to women and children. 2 ' He also
conceded that he informed the commanders that hurting a few
people might make it clear that the Israeli security forces were to be
treated with respect.25 Malinki later explained that he intended to
indicate, but did not articulate, that only individuals deliberately
violating the order, or acting suspiciously, were to be shot.2  The
Court of Appeals determined that while Malinki did not exceed
Shadmi's command that he provided a "cruel interpretation" since
it should have been his "basic human instinct to exclude at least
women and children from such a lethal order.,
727
Lieutenant Gabriel Dahan was the only commander who
strictly and fully implemented the curfew.7  Others apparently
moderated the harshness and inhumanity of the command and as a
result similar slaughters were avoided in adjoining villages.729
Malinki, immediately upon learning of the killings, issued an order
restricting the use of weapons to situations involving resisting
arrest, assault and flight.3
The Court of Appeals ruled that an order to kill peaceful and
innocent citizens who were returning home from work on the
grounds that this was required to maintain a curfew "is an order to
commit a crime of murder., 73' Israeli law significantly recognized
that an individual was not criminally responsible for an act or
omission carried out in accordance with a superior's orders unless
the command was manifestly unlawful.732 The Court observed that
the values of discipline and the rule of law collided when a soldier
was required to obey an illegal order and that this "creates an
excruciatingly difficult dilemma" for both the legislature which was
charged with creating standards and for the combatant compelled
to choose between insubordination and contravention of criminal
723. Id.
724. Id. at 87.
725. Malinki, supra note 720, at 98. He also resisted a commander who
approached him to lessen the severity of the orders. Id.
726. Id. Malinki also alleged that he admonished the commanders that "'[w]e
shall preserve our soldier's honour and not commit murder."' Id. at 88.
727. Id. at 91.
728. Malinki, supra note 720, at 93.
729. Id. at 95-96.
730. Id. at 93.
731. Id. at 104. The Court held that this was a matter to be adjudged in
accordance with domestic rather than international law. Id. at 105-06.
732. Malinki, supra note 720, at 103.
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law.733 In a significant section, the Court noted three possible
solutions to this dilemma. The imposition of strict liability had the
disadvantage of compelling subordinates to examine and explore
every command and undermined order and discipline.4 The
recognition of superior orders as a justification would insulate every
excess from legal sanction and limit liability to those in command.735
The preferable position recognized the difficulty of reconciling
these competing considerations and struck an intelligent balance by
affirming the obligation of soldiers to obey all but manifestly
unlawful orders."' The Court noted that the illegal character of
these clearly criminal commands must "wave like a black flag" and
do not require the subtle and nuanced judgment of the trained legal
expert.737 This was an objective standard based on the perception of
a reasonable combatant; the subjective belief of the defendant as
well as the belief of other witnesses as to the legality of an order are
not strictly relevant.738 In applying this test, a court should consider
evidence concerning the circumstances under which a defendant
carried out an order, including his knowledge, beliefs, and honest
and reasonable mistakes which might have influenced his
behavior.3
This recognition that the manifest illegality of an order was, in
part, dependent on the context as well as the content of the
command constituted a significant contribution to the jurisprudence
of superior orders.7 ' The Military Court of Appeal affirmed the
acquittal of Privates Mahluf Haroush and Eliahu Avraham for
killing civilians on the grounds that the order was "sudden and
unexpected" and that they had not been afforded sufficient time to
733. Id. at 106.
734. Id. at 107.
735. Id. at 107-08.
736. Id. at 108.
737. Malinki, supra note 720. Among the factors a court should take into
account in deciding whether an order is manifestly illegal are: the difference in
rank between the issuer and recipient of the order; whether the receiver had
grounds for believing that the issuer had access to facts unknown to the receiver;
whether the receiver had time to clarify to himself whether the order was lawful;
was the order issued in times of normality or emergency; did the receiver have a
reasonable basis for believing that he would suffer death or great bodily harm in
the event that he refused to execute the order. In addition, a defendant is to be
provided with the benefit of the doubt as to any honest and reasonable mistake as
to the facts which led him to execute the order. Id. at 109-10.
73& Id. at 111. The defendant must demonstrate that he acted in accordance
with an order issued by an authorized authority and the prosecution then bears the
burden of proof in establishing manifest illegality. Id. at 112.
739. Id.
740. See supra note 739 and accompanying text.
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weigh and balance the legality of the command."' The Court,
however, determined that Corporal Gabriel Uliel, Privates Albert
Fahima and Edmund Nahmani possessed a brief, but sufficient
period to reflect on the killing of seventeen individuals.742 They
witnessed Lance Corporal Shalom Ofer order women from a car,
heard the individuals beg for their lives, and then complied with an
order to open fire.743
The Court concluded that the "brutal and inhuman nature" of
the curfew orders should have aroused the conscience of the
appellants, including the lowest-ranking combatants, despite the
"special circumstances" that prevailed.7 " On the other hand, the
appellants could have reasonably believed that orders emanating
from the high command on the eve of the 1956 Sinai campaign had
been closely considered by knowledgeable authorities.7 45  The
defendants also functioned as mere "conveyors" or "executors" of
the order and acted out of a sense of military "duty" rather than
"personal gratification., 74 The Court later invoked these special
circumstances in mitigating the punishment of the privates and
Uliel to three years in prison.747 Ofer bore responsibility for
ordering the killing of seventeen women and children and, despite
his relatively low rank of corporal, was sentenced to ten years.'
Malinki closely conveyed the orders of his superior and was not
found to have intended to cause such a large-scale slaughter. He
nevertheless was charged with primary responsibility and was
sentenced to fourteen years in prison.7 9 Dahan implemented the
order in the village, participated in the killings, and was sentenced
to ten years.7 0  The military court stressed that the spiritual
superiority of Israel primarily was based on the "moral values of
our State, its army and all its citizens., 751 The sentences of Ofer,
741. See Malinki, supra note 720, at 112 (emphasis omitted).
742. Id. at 114.
743. Id.
744. Id. at 114.
745. Id. at 113.
746. Malinki, supra note 720, at 114.
747. Id. These included the imminent 1956 Sinai campaign and the uncertainty
as to whether the troops would find themselves on the frontline in the event of an
attack from Jordan; the harsh and repeated discipline imposed on this Border
Police battalion attached to the military; the admonitions issued by Malinki; and
the fact that the curfew orders emanated from the top command and were passed
on by Major Malinki. Id. at 113.
748. Id. at 115.
749. Id.
750. Malinki, supra note 720.
751. Id. at 116.
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Malinki and Dahan subsequently were administratively reduced
and Shadmi was released with a reprimand and inconsequential
fine.752
Malinki contributed to the jurisprudence of command
responsibility by providing a memorable metaphor for evaluating
the manifest illegality of an order 753 and by clarifying that the
manifest illegality of an order was to be evaluated in light of the
reactions of a reasonable person under the circumstances and
context of the command.5 ' These same factors then might be
weighed in mitigation of punishment 7" This insured that lower-
ranking combatants in the field benefited from a generous and
flexible standard of guilt and punishment.756  The decision also
demonstrated the inclination of national tribunals to treat domestic
defendants with understanding and leniency.757
In the Border Guards Prosecution Case, two former German
Democratic Republic (GDR or East Germany) border guards were
convicted of unlawful homicide by the Juvenile Chamber of a
Regional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany.7 58 Defendant
W was sentenced to youth custody for eighteen months and H to a
term of imprisonment of twenty-one months, both sentences were
suspended and the defendants were placed on probation.759
The two shot and killed S, a twenty year old citizen of the
GDR as he ascended a ladder and placed his hand on the top of a
wall separating East from West Berlin.76  S was not taken to a
police hospital for two hours and died an hour later; he would have
752. See id. The Chief of Staff reduced Malinki's term to ten years and Dahan's
and Ofer's to eight years. The President of the State of Israel reduced the terms of
Malinki and Dahan to five years. The Committee for the Release of Prisoner's
ordered the remission of one third of the prison sentences. Id.
753. See supra notes 737-39 and accompanying text.
754. See supra notes 740-43 and accompanying text.
755. See supra note 747 and accompanying text.
756. See supra notes 748-52 and accompanying text.
757. See supra note 802-07 and accompanying text. The most prominent Israeli
case involving superior orders was the prosecution of Nazi war criminal, Adolf
Eichmann. See Israel v. Eichmann (Dist. Ct., Dec. 12, 1961), 36 I.L.R. 18 (1961)
affd 36 I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct., May 29, 1962). Eichmann's principle defense was
that he was trained and obligated to serve as an obedient and unquestioning
subordinate who was expected to carry out every command, regardless of whether
the order required repression or murder. Id. at 254. The District Court
determined that Eichmann knowingly and enthusiastically pursued a clearly
criminal course of conduct. Id. at 258, 270. The Supreme Court judgment contains
a particularly useful discussion of superior orders. See id. at 313-14.
758. Border Guards Prosecution Case (Fed. Sup. Ct., Fed. Repub. Germany,
Nov. 3, 1992), 100 INT'L L. REPr. 366 (1997).
759. Id. at 369.
760. Id. W was a non-commissioned officer; H was a private. Id.
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survived had treatment been immediately provided."' The two
guards were under orders to prevent escape and, if necessary, to kill
escapees."' Instead of firing single shots as required, both fired
their weapons on automatic; H fired twenty-five cartridges, and W
twenty-seven, within a five second period.763 The defendants aimed
at the escapee's legs with full knowledge that rapid fire increased
the risk of a fatal shot.M
The orders issued to border guards authorized the use of
firearms as a last resort in order to preserve the "inviolability" of
the border. In this effort, the life of the escapee, "where
possible," was to be spared."6 At the same time, the guards were
admonished that "all means "were to be deployed to prevent a
fugitive from reaching West Berlin 76 ' This included the "deliberate
killing "of fugitives in those instances in which there was no other
effective and more lenient alternative. 68 The guiding principle was
that it was better that an individual die than escape. 769  The
admonition regularly repeated to guards was that "'[i]n no event
are breaches of the border to be permitted. A person violating the
border is to be caught or destroyed.' ' '770 A border guard who killed
an escapee was decorated and rewarded rather than punished.
The Federal Supreme Court concluded that the prevention of
border crossings was of "overwhelming importance" for the GDR
and that the life of the escapee was of secondary significance. 2 The
Court accordingly determined that firing on automatic without first
aiming single shots at the legs would not have been regarded as
contrary to prevailing practice and unlawful in East Germany at the
material time.773 The guards likely realized that the deceased was at
761. Id.
762. Id. at 369. The following steps were to be followed: challenge to the
fugitive; attempt to apprehend the fugitive on foot; fire a warning shot; a single
shot, or if necessary shots aimed at the legs; continuous shooting if necessary with
"fatal effect until the escape is prevented." Border Guards Prosecution Case, 100
INT'L L. REPT. at 370.
763. Id. at 369.
764. Id. at 369.
765. Id. at 376.
766. Border Guards Prosecution Case, 100 INT'L L. REPT. 366.
767. Id. at 377.
768. Id.
769. Id.
770. Id.
771. Border Guards Prosecution Case, 100 INT'L L. REPT. 366.
772. Id. at 378.
773. Id.
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the top of the wall and single shots could not have been fired in a
774
sufficiently rapid manner to prevent his escape.
The Supreme Court noted that the defense of superior orders
under East German law was inapplicable in those instances in
which the command "represents a manifestly gross violation of
fundamental concepts of justice and humanity. ' '77 East as well as
West Germany had acceded to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights.776 In the view of the Supreme Court, East
Germany's harsh policy towards escapees contravened the
Covenant's provisions pertaining to freedom of movement across
borders and the arbitrary deprivation of life.7
The Supreme Court clarified that interpreting the Border Law
in accordance with human rights principles would permit the use of
firearms to prevent an escape, but this would not pertain in the case
of an unarmed individual who posed no threat to the guards or to
others. 778  The Tribunal noted that it was not bound by the
interpretation which had been accorded to the statute in the GDR;
and that it did not constitute retroactive punishment to adjudge the
lawfulness of the defendant's actions in accordance with what
would have been the law had the statute been "correctly applied" at
the time of the defendants' acts. 79 The Court determined that the
defendants were guilty of unlawful homicide while acting under
orders.7 8 The fact that the defendants were not aware of the
manifestly illegal nature of the order was not controlling.'
The Supreme Court recognized the difficulty of applying the
test of manifest illegality under these conditions. The political
leadership of East Germany condoned the killings of escapees."
The defendants, In light of their training and experience, could not
be faulted for countenancing and carrying out the illegal
command.783 Despite the "horror" of this killing, which was "devoid
of any reasonable justification,"7 the Supreme Court held that the
774. Id.
775. Id. at 380.
776. Border Guards Prosecution Case, 100 INT'L L. REPT. at 380-81.
777. Id. at 380-83.
778. Id. at 387.
779. Id. at 390.
780. Id. at 391.
781. Border Guards Prosecution Case, 100 INT'L L. REPr. 366.
782 Id. at 392.
783. Id. The Court credited defendant H with recognizing that his conduct was
inhumane, indicating a stirring of his conscience. Id.
784. Id.
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Juvenile Chamber properly mitigated the defendants' punish-
ment.785
In the Borders Guards Prosecution Case, the defendants were
found to have strictly complied with the requirements of East
German law.7" The German Federal Supreme Court, however,
retroactively construed East German legislation in accordance with
human rights principles and ruled that the defendants carried out
the command in a manifestly illegal fashion.7" The lenient
sentences recognized that the youthful defendants were ill-
equipped and poorly positioned to analyze and to resist the order."
The Border Guards Prosecution Case seems to have been motivated
by a desire to demonstrate the depredations of the former East
German communist regime and leadership.789
B. Canada
The Canadian case of Regina v. Finta continued the judicial
trend towards considering the context in conjunction with the
content of superior orders.7" Imre Finta served as a captain in the
Royal Hungarian Gendarmerie and was posted to Szeged by the
Nazi controlled regime.91 Finta was charged with carrying out the
so-called "Baky Order" and allegedly supervised the isolation,
ghettoization, and deportation of 8,617 Hungarian Jews to
Auschwitz where they were subjected to forced labor and
extermination." Finta eventually emigrated to Canada where he
was charged and acquitted of crimes against humanity and war
crimes.793
The Supreme Court, in 1994, affirmed that the trial court
instructions on superior orders were consistent with the relevant
legal standard.94  The Appellate Court recognized that military
785. Border Guards Prosecution Case, 100 INT'L L. REPT. at 393.
786. See supra notes 760-71 and accompanying text.
787. See supra notes 778-81 and accompanying text.
788. See supra notes 782-85 and accompanying text.
789. See supra note 777 and accompanying text.
790. Regina v. Finta [1994] 1 S.C.R. 701 [hereinafter Finta].
791. Id. at 725.
792. Id.
793. Id. at 726. Canadian law permitted prosecution for conduct outside
Canada in those instances in which such conduct constituted a war crime or crime
against humanity and would have been a crime at the time had it been committed
in Canada. Id.
794. See Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 841. The judge instructed the jury to determine
whether a reasonable person in Finta's position would have found the order
manifestly illegal and whether Finta had the choice whether to obey the order. Id.
at 841.
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organizations depend upon immediate, instantaneous and unhesi-
tating obedience to superior orders.795  This has "through the
centuries led to the concept that acts done in obedience to military
orders will exonerate those who carry them out."7 ' Judge Peter
Cory, however, noted that this rule has been disregarded in the case
of manifestly illegal orders.7' These are commands which offend
the conscience of "any reasonable, right-thinking person; it is an
order which is obviously and flagrantly wrong."798 The order cannot
be in a "grey area or be merely questionable; rather it must patently
and obviously be wrong.",
799
The Court noted that the moral choice test utilized by the
Nuremberg Tribunal was adopted to insure equity and fairness in
those instances in which subordinates were involuntarily compelled
to carry out manifestly illegal orders." In the absence of moral
choice, individuals were deemed to lack the requisite criminal
intent." Judge Cory observed that the lower a subordinate's rank,
the greater the sense of compulsion and the less likelihood that the
individual was able to exercise discretion.8 The defense of
compulsion was consistent with the view that superior orders were
merely a factual element which, like mistake of law, was to be
considered in determining whether a defendant possessed the
requisite criminal intent."
Judge Cory held that despite the fact that Finta did not take
the stand that the trial judge possessed the discretion to issue an
instruction on superior orders based on his conclusion that there
was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury properly instructed to
acquit.' Cory then enumerated various factors which supported
the claim that the defendant reasonably believed that the order to
detain and to deport Jews was legally proper and prudent. 85 These
included a state of war, the imminent invasion by the Soviet army,
the public perception that the Jews were subversive and disloyal
and should be deported, the involvement and the endorsement of
795. Id. at 828-29.
796. Id. at 829.
797. Id. at 829, 834.
798. Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 834.
799. Id.
800. Id. at 838.
801. Id.
802. Id.
803. Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 839.
804. Id. at 846.
805. Id. at 847.
[Vol. 20:1
THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE
deportation and confiscation of property by the German and
Hungarian regimes and populations.8
In Malinki and the German Border Guards Prosecution Case
the courts determined that orders to kill defenseless civilians were
manifestly illegal.f In Finta, the Canadian Supreme Court
determined that a Canadian court properly instructed a jury to
consider whether a defendant Finta reasonably believed that an
order to cleanse a city of Jews and to confiscate their property was
legally justified." Judge Cory's argument that the order might have
reasonably appeared lawful in light of the circumstances and
context of German occupied Hungary ° seemingly overlooks the
cruel and callous conditions of the Jews jammed into boxcars
destined for the death chambers at Auschwitz.81
VI. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
A. Statutory Provisions
The statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) specifically recognized the defense of
superior orders. " ' Article 7(4) adopted the familiar standard that
the fact that an accused acted pursuant to an order of a "Govern-
ment or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if
the International Tribunal determines that justice so requires., 81 2
Article 7(3) clarified that a superior is not relieved of criminal
responsibility in the event that he "knew or had reason to know" of
a subordinate's criminal conduct.813 The commentary clarified that
superior orders cannot absolve an individual of criminal respons-
ibility and should not be considered a defense to criminal liability.1 4
Obedience to commands, however, may be recognized in mitigation
806. Id. at 847-48. See also id. at 841.
807. See supra notes 744, 798 and accompanying text.
808. See Finta, 1 S.C.R. at 804.
809. Id. at 841.
810. Id. at 791.
811. See United Nations Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing
an International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
former Yugoslavia, 32 I.L.M 1159 (1993) [Report on Former Yugoslavia].
812. Id. art. 7(4).
813. Id. art. 7(3).
814. Id. art. 6(57).
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of punishment in connection with other defenses "such as coercion
or lack of moral choice. 8 5 The latter suggests that superior orders
is not an independent defense and is to be viewed as a factual factor
relevant to a lack of criminal intent.816 A similar provision was
incorporated into the statute of the International Criminal Tribunal
for Rwanda (ICTR).817
A superior orders provision also was incorporated into the
statute of the newly-established international criminal court
(ICC).818 Article 33 provided that the fact that a crime within the
jurisdiction of the Court has been committed pursuant to an order
of a government or of a superior shall not relieve an individual of
criminal responsibility "unless:, 819 the individual was under a legal
obligation to obey the order;82 the person did not know that the
order was unlawful;" and the order was not manifestly unlawful. 2
The Article appears to permit superior orders in mitigation of
punishment as well as a defense to criminal liability.' This,
however, is qualified in Article 33(2) which stipulated that "orders
to commit genocide or crimes against humanity are manifestly
unlawful."824
B. International War Crimes Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia:
Erdemovic Sentencing
In May 1996, Drazen Erdemovic pled guilty to participation in
the killing of Muslim civilians. 5  Erdemovic was a twenty-three
year-old Croatian veteran of the police and military who, in 1991,
joined the multi-ethnic 10th Sabotage Detachment of the Bosnian
815. Id. art. 6(57).
816. Report on Former Yugoslavia supra note 811, art. 6(57).
817. See U.N.S.C. Res. 955 (1994) 33 I.L.M. 1598, art. 6(4) (1994).
818. See Rome Statute, supra note 38.
819. Id. art. 33(1).
820. Id. art. 33(1)(a).
821. Id. art. 33(1)(b)
822. Id. art. 33(1)(c).
823. See Rome Statute, supra note 38, art. 33(1). Article 33 does not fully
clarify whether to hold an individual liable for adhering to superior orders requires
satisfaction of both a subjective and objective standard. See id. art. 33.
824. Id. art. 33(2). Article 31(1)(d) provides for the defense of duress. See id.
art. 31(1)(d). Article 31(3) authorizes the Court to consider any ground for
excluding criminal responsibility which is recognized by the law to be applied by
the Tribunal. See id. art. 31(1)(3). The applicable law is set forth in Article 21.
See id. art. 21.
825. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, IT-96-22-T (sentencing) (Int'l Crim. Trib. Yug.,
Trial Chamber 1, 1996), 108 I.L.R. 180 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/icty
(last visited Oct. 4, 2001).
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Serb army. 8  He was ordered, in July 1995, to report to the
Branjevo farm where his unit was directed to massacre hundreds of
Muslims men seized as a result of the Serb incursion into United
Nations safe area of Srebrenican 7 Erdemovic claimed to have
refused and was warned that "'[i]f you don't wish to do it, stand in
the line with the rest of them and give others your rifle so they can
shoot you."' He was certain that this was a serious threat and that
his wife and child also would be subject to retribution."9  The
roughly 1,200 detainees were led in groups of ten before
Erdemovic's unit and executed." ° He later successfully resisted
participation in the killing of an additional five hundred Muslims."'
Erdemovic subsequently claimed that he was targeted for
assassination in retribution for his protests. 32 On May 31, 1996,
Erdemovic pled guilty to crimes against humanity; the alternative
count of war crimes was dismissed. 3
The Trial Chamber, as a matter of fairness and equity,
examined Erdemovic's plea to determine whether the accused's
claim of superior orders and duress constituted a defense which
negated his criminal intent and plea of guilty.8' The Tribunal noted
that while the statute provided that superior orders might be
considered in mitigation that guidance was not provided in the case
of superior orders accompanied by physical or moral duress.35 In
reviewing the case law from World War II, the Trial Chamber
concluded that "while the complete defense based on moral duress
and/or a state of necessity stemming from superior orders is not
ruled out absolutely, its conditions of application were particularly
strict. ,
836
The order issued to Erdemovic to kill the detainees was
manifestly illegal and his duty was to disobey.837 This obligation
only could be compromised when confronted with "the most
826. Id. 1 2, 79.
827. Id. 80.
828. Id. 80.
829. Id.
830. Erdemovic, 108 I.L.R. 1$ 2, 77. Erdemovic claimed that he attempted to
save a detainee, but that he was told that there were to be no witnesses to the
shootings. Id. 80.
831. Id. 1 81.
832. Id.
833. Id. 3.
834. Erdemovic, 108 I.L.R. 14.
835. Id. 16.
836. Id. 1 19.
837. Id. T 18.
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extreme duress., 838 The latter was to be determined on a case-by-
case basis in light of a strict and stringent analysis as to whether the
accused possessed a moral choice. 839 The Chamber ruled without
discussion that the accused failed to present the requisite proof
required for full exoneration.' 4 The judgment did suggest a lack of
equivalence between the threatened harm to the accused and the
consequences of his criminal activity when it noted that "[a]s
opposed to ordinary law, the violation here is no longer directed at
the physical welfare of the victim alone but at humanity as a
whole.""
The Tribunal concluded that the defense of duress
accompanying superior orders would be taken into consideration
along with other factors in mitigation."2 In considering aggravating
and mitigating circumstances, the Trial Chamber noted that the
heinous nature of crimes against humanity made it unnecessary to
consider aggravating circumstances. In weighing mitigating
circumstances, the Chamber noted that the Nuremberg Tribunal
did not accept superior orders as mitigating the sentences of any of
the high-ranking defendants. 8" The Chamber, however, observed
that other post-World War II prosecutions recognized superior
orders in mitigation of punishment in regards to low-ranking
defendants in those instances in which the order influenced an
accused who otherwise was not "prepared" to undertake the
criminal conduct."5 Courts were inclined to recognize duress in
mitigation even in those instances in which there was "doubt"
whether the accused's obedience was in response to a threat of
serious harm to him or to his family.8  The Court, however, was
unable to corroborate Erdemovic's rendition of events and refused
to consider his plea of extreme necessity in mitigation."7 The Trial
838. Id. J 18.
839. Erdemovic, 108 I.L.R. 19. This was dependent on the imminence and
nature of the threat, the rank of the accused, and the voluntariness of the accused's
participation in the enterprise. Id. $$ 18-19.
840. Id. 20.
841. Id. 19.
842. Id. 20.
843. Erdemovic, 108 I.L.R. 45.
844. Id. 50.
845. Id. 53.
846. Id. 54. The Court identified the purposes of punishment as pubic
reprobation, stigmatization and rehabilitation. Stigmatization of the most serious
violations of international humanitarian law was deemed the primary purpose. Id.
163.
847. Erdemovic, 108 I.L.R. 91 91. The issues which required evidentiary support
included whether the accused could have avoided the situation; confronted a
[Vol. 20:1
THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE
Chamber did indirectly recognize superior orders in mitigation by
noting that at the time of the executions that Eredemovic did not
occupy a "position of authority." The latter was considered in
mitigation along with the accused's age, character, remorse, lack of
dangerous disposition and the fact that his sentence was to be
served in a prison far from his own country."9 The Court sentenced
Erdemovic' to ten years in prison.
C. Erdemovic: Appellate Chamber
The Appellate Chamber determined that although
Erdemovic's guilty plea was voluntary85' that it was not an informed
choice.852 He was deemed to have lacked an understanding of the
nature of the charges and the distinction between the alternative
counts as well as the consequence of pleading guilty to crimes
against humanity rather than war crimes."' The case was accord-
ingly remitted in order to afford Eredemovic the opportunity to
replead to the charges."
Judges Gabrielle Kirk McDonald and Lal Chand Vorah,
however, in a separate opinion, dismissed Erdemovic's claim that
his guilty plea was equivocal in light of his plea of duress.855 The
judges clarified that superior orders and duress were conceptually
distinct and separate issues.856 Superior orders did not constitute a
complete legal defense, but might be considered as a factual
element in adjudging whether the defenses of duress or mistake of
fact were established.857 Duress, of course, also may exist absent
superior orders.' The judges observed that the Einsatzgruppen
was the only post-World War II international decision which
supported the proposition that duress was a defense to the killing of
command which he could not circumvent; faced a threat of immediate death to
himself or to his family; and possessed the "moral freedom" to oppose the order.
Id. 89.
848. Id. 95.
849. Id. at 102-11.
850. Id. (Disposition).
851. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, 12-13, IT-96-22-T (sentencing appeal) (Int'l
Crim. Trib.Yug., App. Chamber, 1997), 111 I.L.R. 298 (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icty (last visited Oct. 4, 2001) (separate opinion of McDonald J.
&Vorah J.) [hereinafter Erdemovic Appeal].
852. Id. 27.
853. Id.
854. Id.
855. Id. 28-29.
856. Erdemovic Appeal, supra note 851, 34.
857. Id.
858. Id. 35.
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innocent civilians.8 19  The American judges in Einstatzgruppen,
however, were unable to cite supporting authority' for this
proposition which, in the view of Judges McDonald and Vohrah,
was in "discord with the preponderant view of international
authorities." 86 The two also noted that a survey of the decisions of
domestic World War II military tribunals and national courts failed
to reveal a "consistent and uniform State practice" as to whether
duress constituted a defense to war crimes and crimes against
humanity.862
Judges McDonald and Vohrah, having concluded that there
was no customary practice, examined whether the duress defense
was accepted under international law as a general principle of law
recognized by civilized nations.863 Civil law countries generally
recognized duress as a defense to the killing of innocents while
common law countries rejected the doctrine. Several civil law
countries, however, explicitly or implicitly rejected the defense in
regards to war crimes.865 Judges McDonald and Vohrah thus
concluded that there was no "consistent concrete rule" as to
whether duress was a defense to the killing of innocents.866
The two judges turned their attention to the public policy
rationale underlying the formation of the international tribunal867
and noted that the court's jurisdiction extended to the most heinous
war crimes committed on a mass scale against innocent civilians.8
Recognition of duress would be contrary to the humanitarian
instinct animating the ICTY statute and the code of armed
conflict. 9 This was not of mere academic concern since the history
of warfare was characterized by countless examples of combatants
being compelled to commit crimes."7 The protection of the
859. Id. 1 43. See supra notes 338-43 and accompanying text.
860. Erdemovic Appeal, supra note 851, 43.
861. Id. 91 44.
862. Id. 55.
863. Id. 91 56-57.
864. Id. 59-60.
865. Erdemovic Appeal, supra note 851, 91 67-69. Various civil law courts
excluded the defense in cases of a lack of proportionality between the threat and
the criminal conduct or based on the special status of the offender. Id. 91 68-69.
866. Id. 91 72.
867. Id. 1 72. "We are of the opinion that this separation of law from social
policy is inapposite in relation to the application of international humanitarian law
to crimes occurring during times of war." Id. 91 78.
868. Erdemovic Appeal, supra note 851, 1 75.
869. Id.
870. Id. 9 76.
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innocent dictated a dismissal of duress as a defense to the killing of
civilians."
The strong policy of protecting the innocent articulated by
Judges McDonald and Vohrah extended to situations in which the
accused confronted a choice between his own death and obeying an
order to kill which inevitably would be carried out by others
regardless of the decision of the accused . They stressed that the
ordinary soldier was trained for combat, assumed the risk of death,
and should be not permitted to take the lives of innocents under the
plea of duress. 3 At the same time, the law was not imposing an
impossibly heroic burden on combatants since deference was
displayed towards the human impulse towards survival and self-
protection through the "sophisticated and flexible tool" of
mitigation of punishment.87 ' In remitting the case based on the fact
that Erdemovic's guilty plea was not informed, Judges McDonald
and Vohrah also ruled that the trial court had improperly refused to
consider the defendant's uncorroborated claim of duress in
mitigation of punishment.7
Judge Haopei Li, in a separate and dissenting opinion, noted
that the national laws and practices of various States in regards to
duress did not reveal a general principle of law universally
recognized by civilized nations. 6 Judge Li's survey of international
military tribunals revealed that duress could constitute a complete
defense under certain circumstances. 7 The defense, however, only
was available in mitigation in the case of serious crimes such as the
killing of innocent civilians or prisoners of war.8 A recognition of
duress as a defense under the latter circumstances would encourage
rather than deter the killing of innocents and facilitate the imple-
mentation of illegal orders.879 "Such an anti-human policy" could
not be countenanced under the international law.' As for the
871. Id. 1 80.
872. Id. 79-80.
873. Erdemovic Appeal, supra note 851, T 84.
874. Id. 85.
875. Id. 90. Judges McDonald and Vohrah ruled that there was no
requirement of corroboration for a plea of duress to be considered in mitigation.
Id. 90.
876. Id. 3.
877. Id. 5. The following requirements were to be met. The act committed to
avoid a serious, irreparable and imminent danger; there was no adequate means of
escape; and the remedy was not disproportionate to the evil. Erdemovic Appeal,
supra note 851, 5.
878. Id.
879. Id. 8.
880. Id.
2001]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
argument that the Muslim victims would have been executed absent
Erdemovic's participation, this would provide a justification for
each and every member of the unit who participated in the
collective massacre of the innocent victims."
Judge Sir Ninian Stephen, in a separate and dissenting opinion,
argued that the Trial Chamber mistakenly accepted the defendant's
guilty plea.8 Erdemovic was under no obligation to corroborate
his claim of duress at the point of entering a plea.8 3 The absence of
such evidence at this stage did not provide grounds for considering
his plea unequivocal,' particularly given the fact that the trial
chamber was not in possession of evidence which undermined
Erdemovic's claim. 5 The issue of proportionality likewise should
have been determined at trial." This was not a question of
weighing one life against another. 7 The death of the Croat
Erdemovic likely would have had little impact on the Serb soldiers'
extermination expedition." Judge Stephen concluded that recogni-
tion of duress as a complete defense under such circumstances was
consistent with the general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations."' The Trial Chamber, at this initial stage of the
proceedings, should have entered a plea of not guilty and engaged
in a precise and prudent examination of the evidence at trial.98
Judge Stephen accordingly determined that Erdemovic's plea was
equivocal and remitted the case to provide the appellant with the
opportunity replead with full awareness of the consequences.
Judge Antonio Cassese, in a separate and dissenting opinion,
concluded that in exceptional circumstances that duress may be
urged as a defense to crimes against humanity or war crimes and
that the appellant's guilty plea, as a consequence, was equivocal. 2
He accordingly would have remitted the case to the Trial Chamber
for entry of a non-guilty plea and a determination of the issue
whether or not the appellant was acting under duress.893
881. Id. 11.
882. Erdemovic Appeal, supra note 851, 18.
883. Id.
884. Id.
885. Id. TT 20-21.
886. Id. 19.
887. Erdemovic Appeal, supra note 851.
888. Id.
889. Id. TT 64-67.890. Id. T 22.
891. Id. T1 69.
892. Erdemovic Appeal, supra note 851, 50.
893. Id. Judge Cassese stressed that the Trial Court must determine whether
when the appellant joined he Sabotage Unit was aware of the plan to violate the
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Judge Cassese exhaustively surveyed the case law of
international military tribunals and of common law countries.9 4 In
contrast, to the majority of his brethren, Cassese argued that in the
absence of a clear consensus that duress was to be applied on a
case-by-case basis to all categories of crime.9 He recognized that
the proportionality requirement of the defense of duress meant that
the defense rarely would be applicable in those instances in which
an individual endeavored to save his own life at the expense of an
innocent victim. 6  This, however, was a matter for a court in
weighing and balancing the facts and circumstances of a specific
case in light of the elements of the defense.897 A court might credit
the fact that an accused took all possible measures to save the
victims before yielding to duress or that the victims would have
died in any event.8 Judge Cassese, in fact, argued that there was
some indication that duress was admissible as a defense in those
instances in which it was highly probable, if not certain, that if the
individual acting under duress refused to commit the crime that the
delict would have been successfully carried out by others."
Judge Cassese stressed that the value placed upon human life
dictated a strict analysis of the facts in the killing of innocents under
the claim of duress." In evaluating the factual circumstances, a
court should consider that the lower the rank of the individual, the
less likely that he exercised a moral choice, particularly in those
instances in which the accused was a member of an execution
squad."1 A trial chamber also must consider whether the individual
pleading duress shared the intent to carry out the crime and inquire
into whether the accused confessed and denounced his criminal
humanitarian law of war or later learned of this and nevertheless failed to leave
the unit. Duress was not available to a defendant who voluntarily placed himself
in a situation which he knew would entail the unlawful execution of civilians. Id.
50.
894. See id. $$ 21-39.
895. Id. 41. The four criteria were a severe threat to life or limb; no adequate
means to escape the threat; proportionality in the means taken to avoid the threat;
the situation of duress should not have been self induced. Erdemovic Appeal,
supra note 851.
896. Id. $1 42. Judge Cassese presented the hypothetical situation of an inmate
of concentration camp who was starved and beaten for months and then told after
a brutal beating that if he does not kill another inmate that his eyes will be gouged
out. The inmate who is to be killed already has beaten with metal bars and likely
will be killed in any event. Id. 47.
897. Id. 42.
898. Id.
899. Erdemovic Appeal, supra note 851, 9$ 44.
900. Id.
901. Id. $1 45.
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conduct at the earliest possible opportunity." Concealment and
cover-up was consistent with an inference that the perpetrator
acquiesced in the act which he allegedly perpetrated under duress. 3
The Trial Court, in the view of Judge Cassese, should have
entered a plea of not guilty and conducted a trial to examine the
merits of Erdemovic's claim of duress.9 Cassese argued that
denying the defense under conditions in which the accused could
not have saved the victims by sacrificing his own life was
establishing an unrealizable standard of behavior which required
individual martyrdom.9°5 The majority sought to avoid making
difficult decisions by limiting duress to mitigation and moderating
the sentence.9 This avoided addressing the core question whether
there were circumstances in which an individual who sought to save
his own life had acted in a morally and legally justifiable fashion. 9°7
Absent transnational standards, Judge Cassese argued that his
brethren should have properly applied the law of the former
Yugoslavia which recognized the total defense of duress rather than
deny the defense in the ill-defined interests of international public
policy.'
D. Trial Chamber: Erdemovic Re-Sentencing
The Appeals Chamber remitted the case to another trial
chamber and directed that Erdemovic be afforded the opportunity
to replead with full knowledge of both the nature of the charges
and consequences of his plea.9°9 On January 14, 1998, Erdemovic
pled guilty to .violating the laws and customs of war.90 The
prosecutor withdrew the alternative charge of crimes against
humanity.9 "
Erdemovic declined to offer oral testimony, relied on his
previous statements and agreed that the events alleged in the
indictment were accurate. 9'2  Although Erdemovic admitted
902. Id. 46.
903. Id.
904. Erdemovic Appeal, supra note 851, 50.
905. Id. 47.
906. Id. 48.
907. Id.
908. Id.
909. Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, IT-96-22-T, 7 (sentencing judgment) (Int'l
Crim. Trib. Yug., Trial Chamber II, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 1182 (1998), available at
http://www.un.org/icty (last visited Oct. 4, 2001).
910. Id.
911. Id. 8.
912. Id. T 13.
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participating in the killing of hundreds of Bosnian male civilians,
the Trial Chamber accepted that the accused committed these
offenses under the threat of death.913 The Trial Chamber, having
determined that there was duress, applied the ruling of the
Appellate Chamber that duress does not afford a complete defense
to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity or war crime
involving the killing of innocent human beings, but may be
considered in mitigation.!"
In considering factors aggravating Erdemovic's punishment,
the Trial Chamber estimated that the accused killed as many as one
hundred individuals. 9"5 The Chamber ruled that the "magnitude"
and the "scale" of the crime and the role of the accused were
aggravating circumstances to be taken into account in sentencing.916
On the other hand, the Trial Chamber recognized in mitigation that
the accused only was twenty-three at the time of the killings,9"7 and
had been a low-ranking combatant who elected to serve in the
Sabotage Unit precisely because it was not engaged in combat on
the frontlines91 He was said to be tolerant and friendly towards all
ethnic groups and, in fact, married a Serbian women9  Erdemovic'
voluntarily admitted his guilt and assisted the prosecution in this
and other cases." He also suffered from post-traumatic stress and
extreme sorrow and remorse as a result of his involvement in the
killings.921
Investigator Jean Rene' Ruez addressed the issue of duress
during the sentencing hearing and testified concerning the vicious-
ness of the war, the brutality of the siege of Srebrenica, the
pervasive orders to commit atrocities, the accused's vulnerable
position as a Bosnian Croat in the Serbian army and his disagree-
ments with his superior officers and subsequent demotion to
private. 2 Ruez affirmed that had Erdemovic refused to shoot that
"'most certainly, he would get into very deep trouble."' 923
The Trial Chamber noted that although Erdemovic displayed a
persistent psychological predisposition to feel overwhelmed and
913. Id. 14.
914. Erdemovic, 37 I.L.M. 1182.
915. Id. 91 15. Erdemovic estimated that he had killed seventy persons. Id. 15.
916. Id.
917. Id. 16.
918. Erdemovic, 37 I.L.M. 1182.
.919. Id.
920. Id.
921. Id.
922. Id.
923. Erdemovic, 37 L.L.M. 1182.
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helpless that the evidence revealed the "extremity of the situation"
faced by the defendant9 2 ' There was a "real risk that the accused
would have been killed had he disobeyed the order. He voiced his
feelings, but realized that he had no choice in the matter: he had to
kill or be killed.,
925
In setting the sentence in light of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances, the Trial Chamber stressed the terror,
violence and certainty of death experienced by the victims as well
as the accused's reluctance to participate and his remorse over his
involvement.926 In the end, the Court placed considerable weight on
Erdemovic's open and cooperative attitude and sentenced him to
five years in prison.9
In summary, in Erdemovic, duress was recognized as distinct
from superior orders2  However, the appellate court recognized
that a plea of duress typically was entered in situations in which an
individual was coerced into complying with a manifestly illegal
order2 9 The claim of duress in the killing of innocent civilians in
which the death of the victims was inevitable was limited to a plea
in mitigation in which certain requisite conditions were satisfied.9°
In applying the duress in mitigation, the Trial Chamber considered
a broad-range of circumstances which might have led to Erdemovic
feeling compelled and coerced into participating in the slaughter.93
The imminence and severity of the threat,32 the characteristics of
the conflict, 93  the rank of the accused,934 and lack of knowledge or
criminal intent were central.9
924. Id. $ 17. Erdemovic claimed to have had no other choice than to migrate
from the Republic of Croatia, to join the Serbian military, to leave his bedridden
wife and to take part in the Srebrenica operation to shoot the Moslem detainees.
He also testified that on one occasion he managed to save some Serbs, assist a
detainee at the farm, questioned the order to execute the detainees and refused to
participate in the second round of executions. Id.
925. Id.
926. Id. 20.
927. Id. 23.
928. See supra note 856 and accompanying text.
929. See supra note 857 and accompanying text.
930. See supra notes 872-74, 881 and accompanying text.
931. See supra notes 923-27, and accompanying text.
932. See supra note 925 and accompanying text.
933. See supra note 923 and accompanying text.
934. See supra note 922 and accompanying text.
935. See supra note 926 and accompanying text.
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VII. Conclusion
The excesses of World War I called into question the
traditional doctrine of respondeat superior, which limited liability
to officers and officials issuing criminal commands.36  The
Commission on Responsibility advocated bringing German war
criminals before the bar of justice.937 This recommendation was
incorporated into the Versailles Peace Treaty which incorporated
an unprecedented provision for criminal prosecution.9Y8  This
scheme foundered on the shoals of politics and a modest number of
individuals were tried before the Penal Senate of the German
Supreme Court.939 The Leipzig Court displayed some sympathy for
these domestic defendants and generally meted out lenient
penalties to individuals relying on the superior orders defense.'
The complexity of the defense was illustrated by the Court's
acquittal of defendant Lieutenant Karl Neumann in the Dover
Castle case based on the accused's reasonable belief that his attack
on a hospital ship constituted a lawful reprisal.' In another case,
the defendant's erroneous belief that he was acting in accordance
with superior orders resulted in conviction for negligent rather than
intentional homicide. 2 The Penal Senate ultimately retreated from
a subjective standard and suggested that a defendant might be held
guilty for following orders which were universally known to be in
contravention of the law of armed conflict.943
World War II resulted in substantial scholarly skepticism
towards the plea of superior orders.9' The Allied Powers limited
the defense 95 in the Nuremberg Charter to a plea in mitigation in
those instances in which justice so required.946 The Tribunal rather
ambiguously ruled that superior orders might be considered in
mitigation where a moral choice was not possible.947 In any event,
936. See supra notes 50-69 and accompanying text.
937. See supra notes 86-104 and accompanying text.
938. See supra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
939. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
940. See supra notes 132 and 156 and accompanying text.
941. See supra notes 113-20 and accompanying text.
942. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
943. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
944. See supra note 236 and accompanying text.
945. See supra notes 245-50 and accompanying text.
946. See supra note 250 and accompanying text.
947. See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
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the Nuremberg Tribunal determined that the grave nature of the
defendants' offenses precluded recognition of superior orders.9 8
The Ensatzgruppen case, decided under Control Council Law
No. 10, continued the trend towards limiting the superior orders
defense, proclaiming that soldiers were reasoning agents and were
not mere automatons.949 Hitler depended upon others to carry out
his commands and these individuals would not be permitted to seek
shelter under the mantle of superior orders.95°  The Court
introduced an objective standard to adjudge the liability of
subordinates, ruling that combatants were obligated to obey lawful
orders and would not be excused in the event that they obeyed
manifestly unlawful commands9  Superior orders only would be
considered in mitigation of criminal culpability.9 2 An individual
was required to engage in unrelenting resistance to illicit orders953
unless his will was overborne through the threat or application of
serious and severe force.9 The American judges also significantly
determined that resistance to Nazi commands typically did not
result in retribution and that the defendants could not credibly
claim that they did not possess a moral choice.955 A superior's
absence from headquarters following the transmittal of an illicit
order 956 or protest after the fact did not constitute a defense.9 7 The
tribunal in the Hostage case expected officers with extensive
experience to be aware of the illicit character of the hostage reprisal
orders. 958  However, uncertainty in legal rules95 9 or resistance
ameliorated liability.96 The High Command decision imposed culp-
ability upon field commanders and their chiefs of staff who
conveyed clearly criminal orders through the chain of command. 96'
Officers were under a duty to decline to disseminate and to resist
such directives. 2
948. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
949. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
950. See supra notes 325-26 and accompanying text.
951. See supra notes 327-29 and accompanying text.
952. See supra note 327 and accompanying text.
953. Sees supra note 344 and accompanying text.
954. See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
955. See supra notes 369-70 and accompanying text.
956. See supra notes 356-61 and accompanying text.
957. See supra notes 362-65 and accompanying text.
958. See supra note 412 and accompanying text.
959. See supra note 414 and accompanying text.
960. See supra notes 416-22 and accompanying text.
961. See supra notes 446-54 and accompanying text.
962. See supra note 441 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 20:1
THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE
The decisions of various other Control Council Law No. 10 and
European domestic and military courts reinforced that a defendant
would be liable in the event that he carried out an obviously
unlawful order or the defendant knew or should have known under
the circumstances that an order was unlawful. 3  There was a
suggestion that combatants were not expected to comprehend the
intricacies of international law and only would be expected to be
aware of legal rules which were generally known and understood by
military men.9" Pleas in mitigation were recognized in those
instances in which individuals performed a minor and mechanical
role in carrying out a categorical command.965 Mitigation was not
recognized in cases in which combatants exercised discretion,
• 96796
invoked claims of culture, or tu quoque.8 Courts also continued
to wrestle with and to recognize the defense of reprisa 969and
entertained the plea of mistake of fact.90
In Calley, an American court-martial dismissed the accused's
claim that he acted in response to superior orders and lacked
criminal intent."" Calley's unsuccessful challenge to the court
martial's reliance on a man of common understanding reason-
ableness standard indirectly raised the issue whether a subor-
dinate's evaluation of the legality of an order can be divorced from
the military tactics and strategy employed in combat.9  Calley and
other Vietnam era prosecutions revealed a continuing trend among
national courts to extend solicitude towards domestic defendants,
particularly ordinary combatants.973
In Malinki, an Israeli military court provided a memorable
"black flag" metaphor for interpreting the manifest illegality
standard. This decision, along with the German Border Guards
Case 9 16 and Finta,9" illustrate the broad context and circumstances
which courts have come to consider in adjudging whether low-
963. See supra notes 519-21 and accompanying text.
964. See supra note 521 and accompanying text.
965. See supra notes 526-53 and accompanying text.
966. See supra notes 566-77 and accompanying text.
967. See supra notes 522-25 and accompanying text.
968. See supra notes 608-11 and accompanying text.
969. See supra notes 603-07 and accompanying text.
970. See supra notes 557-65 and accompanying text.
971. See supra notes 638-65 and accompanying text.
972. See supra notes 666-70 and accompanying text.
973. See supra notes 672-706 and accompanying text.
974. See supra notes 736-39 and accompanying text.
975. See supra notes 720-52 and accompanying text.
976. See supra notes 858-85 and accompanying text.
977. See supra notes 790-806 and accompanying text.
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ranking subordinates reasonably believed that orders were in
accord with domestic and international law and in determining
whether to acquit,1 8 or more typically to mitigate the defendants'
punishment, "9  In Erdemovic, a plurality of the Yugoslav War
Crimes Tribunal determined that there was no clear and consistent
pattern of international opinion regarding recognition of the total
defense of duress for the killing of innocents who, in any event,
would have been executed.9 The Court clarified that the interests
in protection of the civilians 8 ' dictated limiting duress under the
circumstances to a plea in mitigation of punishment.9" In the end,
the Trial Chamber determined that various factors combined to
compel Erdemovic to kill and mitigated his punishment.9
The superior orders defense presents the perennial and
persistent problem of legal regulation over the military manage-
ment of armed conflict. Military organizations require the
expeditious and unquestioning implementation of policy directives
and subordinates are trained to conform and to comply with
superior orders. On the other hand, there are permissible para-
meters on the pursuit of warfare. The implementation of
commands which contravene these constraints poses a threat to
innocents and may spark a spiral of savagery. Legally limiting the
obligation of subordinates to adhere to superior orders, however,
places combatants in the precarious position of being compelled to
choose between patriotism and possible international criminal
culpability. This also assumes that the law of war is sufficiently
clear and concise to be comprehended by both high-echelon and
lower-ranking combatants functioning within the fast-moving field
of combat. High-ranking officers and commanders undoubtedly
are better positioned than subordinate soldiers to adjudge the
legality of orders by reason of education, experience, expertise,
information and perspective. The jurisprudence of the superior
orders defense is an exercise in balancing these competing
considerations.9
The law of command culpability is decidedly titled towards
obedience. Under international law a combatant only is obligated
to resist manifestly illegal orders and ambiguity, uncertainty and
978. See supra notes 741-47 and accompanying text.
979. See supra notes 782-85 and accompanying text.
980. See supra notes 855-81 and accompanying text.
981. See supra notes 868-71 and accompanying text.
982. See supra notes 874-75 and accompanying text.
983. See supra notes 916-27 and accompanying text.
984. See supra notes 1-37 and accompanying text.
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doubt are to be resolved in the interests of obedience.985 The
Nuremberg judgment seemed to limit mitigation to duress.986 The
developing case law, however, has implicitly relied on the "justice"
clause of the Nuremberg Charter provision on superior orders and
has increasingly invoked a myriad of contextual factors to, on
occasion acquit,987 and more frequently to significantly mitigate the
punishment of domestic defendants9 m The result has been to
maintain superior orders as a de facto legal defense."9 This seems
to reflect what appears to be a substantial, but subterranean
international consensus supporting a strong superior orders
defense. The Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law in
Armed Conflicts, for instance, rejected a provision which would
have limited superior orders to a plea in mitigation in the case of
grave breaches of the 1977 Geneva Protocol.' In fact, few
international human rights and humanitarian instruments address,
let alone abrogate, the defense."'
The expectation that subordinates will resist manifestly illegal
orders is contrary to scientific surveys which indicate that a
significant percentage of Americans believe that most people, as
well as themselves, would obey an order during wartime to kill
civilian men women and children.' Respondents view this as an
expression of ethical integrity rather than moral malevolence.
There is some evidence that the respondents' compliant attitude
reflects the ferocious reality of contemporary armed conflict.9
Combatants in Vietnam reportedly believed that soldiers who
disobeyed commands to commit war crimes risked ostracism,
onerous duty assignments, charges of insubordination, demotion
985. See supra notes 795-99 and accompanying text.
986. See supra notes 275-77 and accompanying text.
987. See supra note 741 and accompanying text.
988. See supra notes 744-48 and accompanying text.
989. See supra note 785 and accompanying text.
990. See L.C. Green, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, 27 CAN.
Y.B. INT'L L. 167, 186-87 (1989). See also Protocol Additional to The Geneva
Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
International Armed Conflicts, Dec. 7, 1978, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (1979), 16 I.L.M.
1391 (1977).
991. See Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (1948).
992. See JOANNA BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING FACE-To-FACE
KILLING IN TWENTIETH CENTURY WARFARE 193-95 (1999).
993. See id.
994. See id. at 175-76, 178. The author notes in discussing Vietnam that "in
certain contexts, combatants were actually instructed in the best way of killing
prisoners." Id. at 190.
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and even physical assault."' The ability of soldiers in Vietnam to
evaluate the legality of orders was burdened by the fact that the
military hierarchy actively engaged in ideological indoctrination
while simultaneously resisting educating combatants as to the
requirements of the code of conflict. 96 In his seminal study of the
Nazi military machine, Omar Bartov notes that soldiers were
subjected to a harsh discipline and pervasive political propaganda
which paved the path towards demonization of the enemy, self-
sacrifice and a willingness to engage in atrocity77 Under these
conditions, there was little possibility of combatants challenging or
contesting orders.".
The socio-psychological pressures conspiring towards
compliance and conformity, of course, conflict with the formal
expectations of military manuals, such as the Lesson Plan on the
Geneva Convention prepared by the United States Department of
the Army in 1970.' The plan counseled combatants who received
what they believed to be an illegal order to persuade the officer to
rescind the command."' In the event that the officer persisted in
issuing the order, the subordinate was instructed to disregard the
directive."' The Lesson Plan recognized that, of course, this
"'takes courage,"' but admonished that compliance may result in
criminal punishment." The text stressed that "[n]o one can force
you to commit a crime, and you cannot be court martialled or given
any other form of punishment for your refusal to disobey.""' 3
National courts and military tribunals have reinforced the
norm of obedience by recognizing superior orders in mitigation of
the punishment of lower-ranking domestic defendants charged with
wartime atrocities." The doctrine, however, rarely has been
successfully relied upon by soldiers resisting involvement in war
995. Id. at 198.
996. Id. at 190-91.
997. See OMAR BARTOV, HITLER'S ARMY SOLDIERS, NAZIS, AND WAR IN THE
THIRD REICH 117-23 (1991).
998. See id. at 60. For the twin trends of decentralized ethnic wars, see
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE WARRIOR'S HONOR: ETHNIC WAR AND THE MODERN
CONSCIENCE (1997), and for sophisticated military technology, see MICHAEL
IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR KOSOVO AND BEYOND (2000). Both books challenge
the relevance, clarity and contours of the code of armed conflict. See Lewy, supra
note 203.
999. Green, supra note 48, at 322.
1000. Id.
1001. Id.
1002. Id.
1003. Id.
1004. See supra note 838 and accompanying text.
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crimes.' °  In 1995, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces affirmed the conviction of Captain Yolanda Huet-
Vaughn for desertion with intent to avoid hazardous duty and to
shirk important service based on her refusal to report for service in
the Persian Gulf conflict.1O° The Appellate Court affirmed the
ruling of the court martial excluding evidence that Huet-Vaughn
had been motivated by a desire to educate the American public on
the costs, consequences and illegal character 6f the Persian Gulf
War." The Court also refused to entertain a defense based on
resistance to manifestly illegal orders since Huet-Vaughn was
unable to demonstrate that she had been specifically commanded to
commit a war crime and the plea could not be relied upon to
challenge the decision to wage war."'
The international community is likely to witness a continuing
tension between the formal requirements of the international
humanitarian law of war and the domestic enforcement and
sociological foundations of the superior orders defense.'" The fact
remains, as ominously noted by psychologist Stanley Milgram in the
conclusion of his classic study on obedience, that "[a] substantial
proportion of people do what they are told to do, irrespective of the
content of the act and without limitations of conscience, so long as
they perceive that the command comes from a legitimate
authority."'0' 0
1005. See supra notes 766-74 and accompanying text.
1006. United States v. Huet-Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 111 (1995) cert. denied 517
U.S. 1117 (1996).
1007. Id. at 112-14.
1008. Id.
1009. See HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE
TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989).
1010. STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL
VIEW 189 (1974).
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